Topic: 63 years since the uprising of 63 days

[Maciek]

Now the interesting turn this discussion could take is if someone accused Poland of ruining it. No, not in the 1940s. Not even in the 1930s but during the signing of the Peace of Riga. Had Poles acted the way they ought to have acted, like true victors - Europe would have been completely different afterwards. As it happened, Russia came out of that war (which it lost, for crying out loud!) practically unharmed, its strength remained basically unchanged... Not being a professional historian I can't really back this claim properly but I suspect it's not completely irrational.

So, no one has a comment on this theory? I feel so neglected! You could at least make fun of me or something... Just to show that you care.

[sidoze]

So, no one has a comment on this theory? I feel so neglected! You could at least make fun of me or something... Just to show that you care.

This is not on topic, but have you read Isaac Babel's Red Cavalry stories (or his diary), taken from his experiences during the Polish-Bolshevik war?

[Maciek]

Nope, haven't read it. But I just checked that my Institute library has at least 2 editions - as soon as they reopen after vacation I'm going to borrow that.

[sidoze]

Nope, haven't read it. But I just checked that my Institute library has at least 2 editions - as soon as they reopen after vacation I'm going to borrow that.

good stuff. Try to grab the Odessa Stories too, and if still interested, the 1920 diary. In English we have the complete works in a convenient single volume:

http://www.amazon.com/Complete-Works-Isaac-Babel/dp/0393328244/ref=pd_bbs_sr_1/002-6356073-1124834?ie=UTF8&s=books&qid=1186574076&sr=1-1

http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9D03E2DE1F39F93BA25752C1A9679C8B63

[Redbeard]

Aside from Lend Lease and the strategic bombing campaign (which would have likely occurred if the US had not made Europe a priority) US prioritizing the European theater did little to effect the eventual outcome.  The Soviets defeated Nazi Germany, not the Western Allies.  The western front was a secondary aspect of the war in Europe.

Had the US not entered the war when it did and made Europe first priority and not the Pacific (where the direct threat to the US was), Europe would have ended up under control of either Nazi Germany or the USSR.  Compared to having at least western Europe free at the end of the war, I still stand by my statement that things would have been much worse. 

But this assertion that the western allies were only a minor player in the European theater and that Russia would have taken care of the Nazis without the other allies is a very strange one to say the least.  Even before the first US troops landed in North Africa, the impact on the eastern front was significant.  Hitler was forced to keep far more troops and equipment out of the battle of Stalingrad than he could have otherwise committed.  The eventual outcome notwithstanding, I'm not aware of any historian who suggested that battle was anything but close.  The Soviet Union came extremely close to total collapse.  What tipped the balance in the battle was when Stalin was able to commit additional troops after learning that he wasn't at risk of facing a two front war, at exactly the time that the Nazi's couldn't do the same thing.  Beyond Stalingrad (which was really a fight for Soviet existence), it isn't hard to see the huge change in fortunes the Soviets experienced once the allies landed in Normandy.  Historical revisionism aside, it was no coincidence that the Soviets launched Operation Bagration shortly after the landings at Normandy, or that they finally started to overwhelm the Nazis at this point. 

[bwv 1080]

Had the US not entered the war when it did and made Europe first priority and not the Pacific (where the direct threat to the US was), Europe would have ended up under control of either Nazi Germany or the USSR.  Compared to having at least western Europe free at the end of the war, I still stand by my statement that things would have been much worse. 

But this assertion that the western allies were only a minor player in the European theater and that Russia would have taken care of the Nazis without the other allies is a very strange one to say the least.  Even before the first US troops landed in North Africa, the impact on the eastern front was significant.  Hitler was forced to keep far more troops and equipment out of the battle of Stalingrad than he could have otherwise committed.  The eventual outcome notwithstanding, I'm not aware of any historian who suggested that battle was anything but close.  The Soviet Union came extremely close to total collapse.  What tipped the balance in the battle was when Stalin was able to commit additional troops after learning that he wasn't at risk of facing a two front war, at exactly the time that the Nazi's couldn't do the same thing.  Beyond Stalingrad (which was really a fight for Soviet existence), it isn't hard to see the huge change in fortunes the Soviets experienced once the allies landed in Normandy.  Historical revisionism aside, it was no coincidence that the Soviets launched Operation Bagration shortly after the landings at Normandy, or that they finally started to overwhelm the Nazis at this point. 

The overwhelming majority of the German army was committed in the East. In 1941-43 the Germans had a relatively insignificant amount of military resources tied down in the West and the amount would not have materially changed had the US taken a less active role in Europe - occupation forces would still be needed in France, Holland etc.  Stalin was able to commit reserves in the Battle of Moscow because he learned through intelligence sources that the Japanese would not attack the USSR in the east, it had nothing to do with American policy.  Normandy had little to do with the success of Bagration (which dwarfed Normandy in size and Axis casualties).  As I said before, the most valuable contributions of the West prior to Normandy were the Lend Lease program and the strategic bombing campaign.  These did play a key role in the Soviet victory.

[Redbeard]

Normandy had little to do with the success of Bagration (which dwarfed Normandy in size and Axis casualties). 

Saying that Normandy had little to do with the success on the eastern front is as absurd as saying that the Nazis being tied up on the eastern front by the Russians had litle to do with the success at Normandy or the Battle of the Bulge.  Germany was fighting on two major fronts, and had to divide it's resources accordingly.  The very fact that even with the Soviets on one side and the UK, Canada, and the US on the other the fighting was so difficult and the outcome at several times anything but certain should make this exceedingly clear. 

As I said before, the most valuable contributions of the West prior to Normandy were the Lend Lease program and the strategic bombing campaign.  These did play a key role in the Soviet victory.

Don't you mean Allied victory? 

[bwv 1080]

Saying that Normandy had little to do with the success on the eastern front is as absurd as saying that the Nazis being tied up on the eastern front by the Russians had litle to do with the success at Normandy or the Battle of the Bulge.  Germany was fighting on two major fronts, and had to divide it's resources accordingly.  The very fact that even with the Soviets on one side and the UK, Canada, and the US on the other the fighting was so difficult and the outcome at several times anything but certain should make this exceedingly clear. 

But the two fronts were by no means proportional - throughout the war the overwhelming majority of the German Army was engaged in the East.  The Soviets had the only land force capable of defeating the Germans - the Western Allies could not politically stomach the casualties it would have taken them alone, nor were their field commanders aggressive enough or their troops well trained.   North Africa, Italy and Western Europe combined account for less than 10% of German war casualties (http://www.axishistory.com/index.php?id=3612)

You can see here (http://www.axishistory.com/index.php?id=7288) that the number of German divisions deployed in the West did not change significantly after the US entry into the war in early 42

[head-case]

You can see here (http://www.axishistory.com/index.php?id=7288) that the number of German divisions deployed in the West did not change significantly after the US entry into the war in early 42

It would be absurd to expect the number of divisions to change immediately after the US entered the war because it would take a significant time for the US to fully deploy its forces.  However, the link you provide indicates that the number of German division in the west doubled between the US declaration of war and operation overlord (starting June 1944).  At that time 2/3 of German divisions were in the east and 1/3 in the West.

[bwv 1080]

It would be absurd to expect the number of divisions to change immediately after the US entered the war because it would take a significant time for the US to fully deploy its forces.  However, the link you provide indicates that the number of German division in the west doubled between the US declaration of war and operation overlord (starting June 1944).  At that time 2/3 of German divisions were in the east and 1/3 in the West.

Right, but the point I was addressing was Redbeard's contention that:

Even before the first US troops landed in North Africa, the impact on the eastern front was significant.  Hitler was forced to keep far more troops and equipment out of the battle of Stalingrad than he could have otherwise committed.

[Maciek]

This is all very interesting but I hardly know anything about it, so I'm going to make an off topic comment:

the Western Allies could not politically stomach the casualties it would have taken them alone, nor were their field commanders aggressive enough or their troops well trained.

Yes, I remember reading somewhere that the Western Allies weren't eager to reach Berlin too quickly because of the horrendous number of casualties a battle inside a city implies. But what surprises me is your assertion that the Red Army was well trained. From what I've heard/read these were very inexperienced soldiers (not to mention badly equipped): one of the main problems in Berlin was supposed to be that these were people who had never been in a big city in their entire lives, and they had no idea how to "navigate" there - they got lost very easily.

(Of course, as I said, my knowledge of these topics is very superficial, and may be all myth...)

[bwv 1080]

This is all very interesting but I hardly know anything about it, so I'm going to make an off topic comment:

Yes, I remember reading somewhere that the Western Allies weren't eager to reach Berlin too quickly because of the horrendous number of casualties a battle inside a city implies. But what surprises me is your assertion that the Red Army was well trained. From what I've heard/read these were very inexperienced soldiers (not to mention badly equipped): one of the main problems in Berlin was supposed to be that these were people who had never been in a big city in their entire lives, and they had no idea how to "navigate" there - they got lost very easily.

(Of course, as I said, my knowledge of these topics is very superficial, and may be all myth...)

The Red Army got better as the war progressed, so by 1944 a sizeable proportion were veteran troops.  The most important difference was that the Red Army was in general much more aggressive than the US or British forces (aside from elite units like the 101st Airborne or Army Rangers).  The English were still traumatized from the casualties suffered in WW1 and were inordinately sensitive to losing troops and the US forces were largely green units.

[Maciek]

Being a veteran soldier probably doesn't have much to do with knowing what a wristwatch is etc.

Andrei, I wonder if in Romania you have similar stories about Red Army soldiers being infinitely uneducated types who had never seen a car or a train or porcelain etc. in their lives. (Not to mention the machine guns on a string - in the cases when they had machine guns.) (Not mention them stealing and demolishing everything on their way... - ah, yes, that I know for sure you have because of the joke you told us earlier...)

[Redbeard]

But the two fronts were by no means proportional - throughout the war the overwhelming majority of the German Army was engaged in the East.

I never claimed the two fronts were "proportional".  You made the assertion that "US prioritizing the European theater did little to effect the eventual outcome", and I merely pointed out that this is entirely incorrect.  Clearly the US had more than a little effect on the German war effort.  As your own stats show, the western allies tied down massive numbers of German divisions.   

You can see here (http://www.axishistory.com/index.php?id=7288) that the number of German divisions deployed in the West did not change significantly after the US entry into the war in early 42

Those are fascinating numbers, but they really do prove my point.  Germany started with 145 divisions committed to the Eastern front at the start of the Russian invasion.  This number grew steadily until it peaked in Feb 1943 at 195.  From here on Germany was steadily removing divisions from the Eastern front to deal with the growing western threat.  In Dec of 1941 Germany had a total of 45 divisions dedicated to the west, Africa, and Italy.  Evidently Hitler gambled that US ground forces wouldn't be an immediate threat because he drew this total down to 30 divisions by June of 1942.  From here however the number only increased, with obvious spikes concurrent with Patton's landing in Africa in the winter of 1942, the invasion of Italy, and Normandy. 

Normandy had little to do with the success of Bagration (which dwarfed Normandy in size and Axis casualties).

I have no data on casualties, but it is interesting to see that in May of 1944 (the month before Op Bagration and Normandy) Germany had 160 divisions on the Eastern front.  By July Hitler had pulled 36 more divisions from the Eastern front, despite the huge offensive by the Soviets.  Obviously Hitler viewed Normandy as something other than irrelevant.  Also, Germany's huge problems of long supply lines and fighting an army intent on defending it's homeland slowly turned around as the Soviets pushed the Germans back.  Now it was Russia's turn to face these obstacles.  Without a second front, it is extremely likely that the Russian advance would have turned into a protracted stalemate much like Hitler ran into in Stalingrad.  The fact that Russia was able to push the Germans back at an accelerated pace in the second half of 1944 just when they faced their longest supply lines and the most determined German resistance proves  how critical the second front was.

[bwv 1080]

I never claimed the two fronts were "proportional".  You made the assertion that "US prioritizing the European theater did little to effect the eventual outcome", and I merely pointed out that this is entirely incorrect.  Clearly the US had more than a little effect on the German war effort.  As your own stats show, the western allies tied down massive numbers of German divisions.   

You are mistaken as to my basic contention.  I said the main contributions were Lend Lease and the Strategic Air Campaign, with Normandy and other actions of secondary importance to the war in the East.  Germany had lost the war there by 1943.  Certainly Normandy hastened the end, but the outcome would not have been different.

Those are fascinating numbers, but they really do prove my point.  Germany started with 145 divisions committed to the Eastern front at the start of the Russian invasion.  This number grew steadily until it peaked in Feb 1943 at 195.  From here on Germany was steadily removing divisions from the Eastern front to deal with the growing western threat.  In Dec of 1941 Germany had a total of 45 divisions dedicated to the west, Africa, and Italy.  Evidently Hitler gambled that US ground forces wouldn't be an immediate threat because he drew this total down to 30 divisions by June of 1942.  From here however the number only increased, with obvious spikes concurrent with Patton's landing in Africa in the winter of 1942, the invasion of Italy, and Normandy. 

Right, at most you are talking about a 20-25% reduction in the amount of forces available for the Eastern Front - but not in time to make any difference in Stalingrad

I have no data on casualties, but it is interesting to see that in May of 1944 (the month before Op Bagration and Normandy) Germany had 160 divisions on the Eastern front.  By July Hitler had pulled 36 more divisions from the Eastern front, despite the huge offensive by the Soviets.  Obviously Hitler viewed Normandy as something other than irrelevant.  Also, Germany's huge problems of long supply lines and fighting an army intent on defending it's homeland slowly turned around as the Soviets pushed the Germans back.  Now it was Russia's turn to face these obstacles.  Without a second front, it is extremely likely that the Russian advance would have turned into a protracted stalemate much like Hitler ran into in Stalingrad.  The fact that Russia was able to push the Germans back at an accelerated pace in the second half of 1944 just when they faced their longest supply lines and the most determined German resistance proves  how critical the second front was.

Hitler did not pull 36 divisions.  The drop of 36 divisions from the East only coincides with an increase of 6 in the West - the remainder were destroyed in Bagration (which was the single largest defeat of Germany in the war).  The key issue with Russian supply was US trucks from the Lend Lease program.

[Redbeard]

Hitler did not pull 36 divisions.  The drop of 36 divisions from the East only coincides with an increase of 6 in the West - the remainder were destroyed in Bagration (which was the single largest defeat of Germany in the war).

Wiki only suggests the Germans lost 20, not 30 divisions, but given the difficulty of such numbers who is to say which is more accurate.  Either way, any way you look at it the Soviets clearly inflicted a massive defeat on the Nazis in that operation.  I will have to learn more about it.  Aside from this I'm going to agree to disagree with you on the other points.  I don't want to derail this thread any longer.  Thanks for the vigorous discussion!   

[Maciek]

I don't want to derail this thread any longer.

I don't think you really were, this is all a pretty "loose" discussion - and I think the stuff you brought up is pretty closely connected. If you feel what you've been doing so far was derailing the thread, then be my guest and continue derailing it just as vigorously as before!

And now, as a sort of depressing interlude, for those who haven't yet been to the wikipedia page on the Warsaw Uprising, some photos of the aftermath preceded by one taken during the uprising itself:

[Maciek]

And on a note related to the Warsaw Uprising and the Tehran conference: it remains a mystery whether the loss of 3 top officers of the Polish Home Army (col. Oziewicz, gen. Rowecki, gen. Sikorski) within one month in 1943 was just a coincidence. The death of general Wladyslaw Sikorski is especially suspicious, not only because of the circumstances surrounding it but also because British authorities have already twice moved the date of declassifying documents related to his death (last time in 2000 - they were supposed to declassify all the files from that period then but for undisclosed reasons decided not to - it seems highly unlikely that revealing state secrets from 1943 would be truly harmful to Great Britain today; it seems quite plausible, OTOH that the true reason for this strange behavior is that the documents might point to British participation in some sort of conspiracy).

The controversies surrounding Sikorski's death are summarized in the wikipedia article about him.

[Maciek]

On the subject of the Warsaw Uprising in the arts:

Don't know how I could forget to mention Andrzej Wajda's Kanal - his very best film, in my opinion, even though it is deeply flawed in terms of historical truth. The movie promotes a communist view of WWII and the uprising (as does the whole of Wajda's trilogy) - completely omitting the Red Army situation, portraying the uprising as doomed from the start and the insurgents as a deeply divided group. Still, though it offers nothing in terms of accurate historical information, it is an extremely moving existentialist tale - as long as you are willing to interpret the story of the small unit of insurgents descending into the canals (and their entrapment there) metaphorically. The movie includes one of Emil Karewicz's truly significant feature roles (he was later to become insanely famous over here because of his role in the TV series Stawka wieksza niz zycie). Also worth mentioning is the fact that the music was written by Jan Krenz, one of the best Polish conductors in history (he's 81 and still active today).

[Maciek]

A bump for the 65th anniversary.