Europe at War

[Florestan]

This seems rather disingenuous.

It is. I apologize again.

[LKB]

He might have little to lose but the world at large has a lot. Encouraging Ukraine to shift from defensive actions to aggressive ones is sheer lunacy.

My friend, with all respect l cannot agree.

Consider: Putin has taken no military action against NATO, even though it is NATO weapons, training and support which have enabled the valiant Ukranians to retain their sovereignty. He fears NATO- rightly- and as his conventional forces have repeatedly come up short, by now he must have weighed the pros and cons of using WMDs against Ukranian targets, and has not done so.

As various experts have theorized, Putin may be committed to holding the line- accepting the status quo- until the Winter, when he may be able to exert more economic pressure against Europe.

By attacking targets within Russia now, the Ukranians can negate that strategy. They can give the lie to Putin's fiction of a " special military operation " in the most undeniable fashion, and the Russian population whom have heretofore been willing to swallow the Kremlin's BS will finally be exposed to the truth, if they can bear to accept it.

So, l believe Biden should remove all restrictions on any American equipment currently being employed in Ukraine. War is always fraught with risk, but there will never be a better time for Ukraine to strike their enemy in a way which will weaken Putin politically.

[Florestan]

My friend, with all respect l cannot agree.

No problem, my friend. If everybody agreed with everybody else the world would be a very boring place.

there will never be a better time for Ukraine to strike their enemy in a way which will weaken Putin politically.

That's a joke, right? Putin's grip on Russian politics is as firm as Lenin's or Stalin's.

Mark my words: Russia will never ever be a functional democracy. The best we can hope for Russia and the world is a moderately authoritarian regime with a clearly defined and widely accepted succession rule --- ie, the restoration of the Tsars. 

[Todd]

and St. Basil Cathedral likewise razed to the ground

You are openly advocating a war crime.

[drogulus]

     Ukraine: Let's grab a bargaining chip to force Putin to withdraw totally and return kidnapped Ukes.

     UNkraine: That's lunacy.

     I'll have to think about that. Certainly if Ukraine could achieve their goals without taking territory it would be preferable. That may not be the case, though.

     I don't want Russia to be destroyed any more than their path towards self-destruction causes. Putin set the course and now are the consequences. Ukrainian mercy is in short supply, understandably so.

[Karl Henning]

I apologize if I did, but given that you rarely clarify what you mean when asked to, I might perhaps be excused.

Since the other guy seldom participates in good faith, you are readily excused.

[Karl Henning]

I note the use of seldom when the adverb never might have served nearly as well.

[Florestan]

     Ukraine: Let's grab a bargaining chip to force Putin to withdraw totally and return kidnapped Ukes.

     UNkraine: That's lunacy.

     I'll have to think about that. Certainly if Ukraine could achieve their goals without taking territory it would be preferable. That may not be the case, though.

     I don't want Russia to be destroyed any more than their path towards self-destruction causes. Putin set the course and now are the consequences. Ukrainian mercy is in short supply, understandably so.

As a Romanian, I would be delighted to see Russia defeated, humiliated, broken in a thousand parts, even wiped off the map altogether. I'm sure the Poles, The Baltics, the Finns and not a few Caucasian nations share this sentiment. But it's wishful thinking. Not going to happen. Russia is here to stay until Judgment Day (involuntary rhyme). They are certainly not at Ukraine's mercy, nor will they ever be.

[MusicTurner]

Time will show whether the roughly 20,000 Russian soldiers in the Kherson district have really gone into a trap, now without deliveries of suppliances, after Ukraine bombed the three bridges across the broad, dividing river there. If it's the result of a plan to tempt them into the situation, it has been a brilliant scheme. Imagine the blow to the Russian army, if 10 - 20,000 of them would surrender there ...

The Russian military leadership there has apparently left, to settle in safer/more comfortable areas.

But a Wagner headquarters was taken out yesterday, when an enthusiastic reporter visited there, and posted pictures on the internet that even included a street sign and house numbers ... Prigozhin, the group's leader, was there, but left before the Ukrainian missile attack. He just wrote in a campaign to get convicts to volunteer, stating directly that murderers would even get first priority, and receive complete amnesty after 6 months of service.

[drogulus]

     Russia has an anti-drone weapon called ROSC-1. The Ukes destroyed it with a tiny drone that dropped a grenade on it.

[milk]

I posted a clip above of a conversation in which "the war of information" gets mentioned and this is another point of interest. I'm truly puzzled by this whole thing but I wonder if we will see some decisive direction by mid-winter at the latest. What strikes me is not that Russia's propaganda machine pumps out something wholly different from the west but how we can get something like the prognosis in the clip I posted, which, again, I think is worth a watch, saying that things are pretty well headed in Russia's direction now vs. day-to-day posts of progress on the Ukraine side. There's such a gulf between how this is reported in various ways.
Maybe I should try to summarize the clip since maybe no one will watch it. I'd have to rewatch to be exact but it was something like:
1. Russia's first two strategies were shocking failures but its third is decisively on course.
2. Russia has something like a 70-80% chance of success now.
3. 20-30% chance on the Ukrainian side isn't nothing. It's something. But not much.
4. The U.S. is in this for ideological reasons and as a kind of war game.
5. The U.S. and NATO have no economic interests in the war.
6. Russia will try to win at all costs; from its standpoint, it cannot afford to let Ukraine fall from its sphere of influence (it has huge economic interests there)
7. Russia will likely commit many war crimes to win but this, of course, doesn't matter to Putin
8. There will likely be a negotiation allowing Ukraine to save some face but keeping it within Russia's control
9. Zelensky will not be allowed to remain.

Here's an historical question for the buffs here: do you think it's true that revolutions rarely succeed with the backing of outside troops?

[Todd]

5. The U.S. and NATO have no economic interests in the war.

I disagree with this.  The US has no economic interest in Ukraine, and NATO members have varying but limited economic interests in Ukraine, but they have substantial economic interests in war.  The US went from third largest to largest exporter of LNG in a few months this year, and not only defense contractors but more mundane companies and industries, like agriculture, also stand to gain.  The US benefits economically from most wars it wages. 

It is self-evident that Russia's interests in Ukraine are near existential, economically and strategically, so they will continue to fight.  I suggest reading some of what William Burns has written in the past about how Russian leaders view Ukraine - from Putin to his most dogged internal foes.  Mr Burns, of course, is a former ambassador to Russia and is the current CIA director.

As to the divergent types of reporting on the war, pro-war propaganda in the US and west is blatantly and obviously skewed.  Some news outlets don't even really try to hide it.  Before it started waning as other, more important topics arose, it was more intensive in some ways than the pro-war propaganda for America's wars earlier this century.  Some eastern, English language sources out of India and Singapore do offer a more detached view.

[drogulus]

6. Russia will try to win at all costs; from its standpoint, it cannot afford to let Ukraine fall from its sphere of influence (it has huge economic interests there)

     Yes, Russia can't afford to lose. They can't afford anything else, either, and victory is the least affordable thing.

     Or am I wrong? Are the Russians like "just wait 'til we get really serious, then we'll show the world and those khokhols who's boss!" Is that it?

     Ah, no, I don't think so. It's every bit as bad as it looks, unless it's worse. Worse is always possible.

[MusicTurner]

I posted a clip above of a conversation in which "the war of information" gets mentioned and this is another point of interest. I'm truly puzzled by this whole thing but I wonder if we will see some decisive direction by mid-winter at the latest. What strikes me is not that Russia's propaganda machine pumps out something wholly different from the west but how we can get something like the prognosis in the clip I posted, which, again, I think is worth a watch, saying that things are pretty well headed in Russia's direction now vs. day-to-day posts of progress on the Ukraine side. There's such a gulf between how this is reported in various ways.
Maybe I should try to summarize the clip since maybe no one will watch it. I'd have to rewatch to be exact but it was something like:
1. Russia's first two strategies were shocking failures but its third is decisively on course.
2. Russia has something like a 70-80% chance of success now.
3. 20-30% chance on the Ukrainian side isn't nothing. It's something. But not much.
(...)
6. Russia will try to win at all costs; from its standpoint, it cannot afford to let Ukraine fall from its sphere of influence (it has huge economic interests there)
(...)
8. There will likely be a negotiation allowing Ukraine to save some face but keeping it within Russia's control
(...)

During the month of July, Russia gained an additional 0.02% of Ukraine's territory.

With that speed, it will take Russia 400 years to a complete win, not including guerilla wars behind the front lines.

A bit more than the planned-for three to seven days.

But the heavy artillery use by the Russians, when they have the supplies, does impose losses for the Ukrainians.

A lot of experts, including for example Galeotti, think that the sanctions will really start to work this autumn. The Yale report saying that Russia's GDP is already now down 40% is debatable, but Russia is really behind as regards sophisticated spare parts for their industry, for example. Car production has gone down to 3%, airline pilots have been officially asked to use their brakes savingly, etc. etc.

Turkey's Russia connections are complicated, both rejecting and positive; export to Russia is going up a lot, partly as a means to overcome some of the sanctions, but Turkey also supports Ukraine, continues to deliver drones, and was a factor in the wheat shipping deal. In Turkey, the popular belief is that Russia's status as a great power in the region is diminishing, and that it is becoming so dependent on a few outside relations (nowadays North Korea and Iran, also India, are mentioned a lot), that Erdogan will have good negotiation cards to press Putin into political compromises.

Ukraine seems determined to attack well into Crimea too - this morning, one large ammunition deposit there, that has been exploding for hours, and one electric supply station, 200 km from the front line.

EDIT: And a few hours later, another airbase in Southern Crimea, with 24 stationed airplanes.

[milk]

I posted a clip above of a conversation in which "the war of information" gets mentioned and this is another point of interest. I'm truly puzzled by this whole thing but I wonder if we will see some decisive direction by mid-winter at the latest. What strikes me is not that Russia's propaganda machine pumps out something wholly different from the west but how we can get something like the prognosis in the clip I posted, which, again, I think is worth a watch, saying that things are pretty well headed in Russia's direction now vs. day-to-day posts of progress on the Ukraine side. There's such a gulf between how this is reported in various ways.
Maybe I should try to summarize the clip since maybe no one will watch it. I'd have to rewatch to be exact but it was something like:
1. Russia's first two strategies were shocking failures but its third is decisively on course.
2. Russia has something like a 70-80% chance of success now.
3. 20-30% chance on the Ukrainian side isn't nothing. It's something. But not much.
4. The U.S. is in this for ideological reasons and as a kind of war game.
5. The U.S. and NATO have no economic interests in the war.
6. Russia will try to win at all costs; from its standpoint, it cannot afford to let Ukraine fall from its sphere of influence (it has huge economic interests there)
7. Russia will likely commit many war crimes to win but this, of course, doesn't matter to Putin
8. There will likely be a negotiation allowing Ukraine to save some face but keeping it within Russia's control
9. Zelensky will not be allowed to remain.

Here's an historical question for the buffs here: do you think it's true that revolutions rarely succeed with the backing of outside troops?

Sorry, I meant WITHOUT the backing of outside troops.

[milk]

During the month of July, Russia gained an additional 0.02% of Ukraine's territory.

With that speed, it will take Russia 400 years to a complete win, not including guerilla wars behind the front lines.

A bit more than the planned-for three to seven days.

Maybe I'll watch it again later. This ex-CIA dude, Bustamante, gave a sort of detailed argument for why he sees little chance of victory for Ukraine at this point. Maybe I can get a sense of that and post more; I can remember few of those details now. I do remember him referring to a large shipment that had to get through Russian approval recently as one example of how Russia has its "foot on Ukraine's neck"?
I'll say this: if Ukraine can win, it'll be a defining event in the 21st century for western values (or whatever you want to call it) and it will be something for the U.S. to crow about certainly (and BTW, I'd be happy with this outcome; I'd hope it would also help the cause against China). I suppose it would have to bring chaos within Russia along with it. On the other hand, if this turns out to go the other way, won't it make the west seem rather cynical and the entire undertaking seem even more tragic? It's a huge cost to Ukrainians in terms of life on top of the debt that Russia as the victor is  unlikely to assume.

[71 dB]

4. The U.S. is in this for ideological reasons and as a kind of war game.
5. The U.S. and NATO have no economic interests in the war.
6. Russia will try to win at all costs; from its standpoint, it cannot afford to let Ukraine fall from its sphere of influence (it has huge economic interests there)

Of course the U.S. has economic interests in the war, the ones that make Russia try to win at all costs. What do people think Hunter Biden was doing in Ukraine?

[Todd]

Maybe I'll watch it again later. This ex-CIA dude, Bustamante, gave a sort of detailed argument for why he sees little chance of victory for Ukraine at this point.

Can you define the word "victory" for this war?

I'd hope it would also help the cause against China

First, even assuming a practical definition of "victory" can be arrived at, Ukrainian victory (or rather, the short-term triumph of American Imperialism) is unlikely to have a material impact on relations with China.  Russia and the United States are declining powers, while China is a rising power.  China's continued rise in power is more broadly based, with direct and massive involvement in the existing international economic system, and on a far larger scale than Russia has ever achieved.  Economic development and the rise and fall of powers is not linear, of course, and there will be bumps along the way, but the sheer scale of Chinese power makes it quite different than Russia. 

Second, I am unclear what the "cause against China" is, but the language is informed by the crusader mentality that is so deeply ingrained in much western foreign policy.  That is, only The West is fit to rule the world.  Which, of course, is untrue.  China does not offer the type of systemic challenge that the USSR did in that it is not trying to either offer an alternative economic system or assume the role of the current dominant power within the (eroding) system, but rather it is building economic and political ties with countries all around the world, including right into Europe.  True, the relationships are unbalanced, in favor of China, which is an approach favored by the US as well.  A more incremental approach, one that relies on building economic and political ties before expanding into military action, is a more measured approach.  Given that China has primarily emphasized reabsorbing Taiwan and dominion over seas bearing the name of China as short- and medium-term objectives, the objectives themselves are limited.  Sure, China can become more expansionist and attempt to build out a network of global military bases to counter the power of the US, but that seems unlikely this decade or next.  First China has to address Taiwan and develop a blue water navy capability to rival the US.  That will take until the 2040s, unless there is a full-scale war before then.  Let's assume all this happens.  Even then, one must ask the big question: So? 

[MusicTurner]

Of course the U.S. has economic interests in the war, the ones that make Russia try to win at all costs. What do people think Hunter Biden was doing in Ukraine?

After all, Hunter Biden is a minor, and apparently deplorable, figure. His salaries and company's earnings in Ukraine allegedly amounted to $ 11 mio, and he had other overseas projects too, such as China.

Though there have surely been some profits to gain, Ukraine's trade with the US before 2022 was rather minute; biggest players in that respect were the EU, then China, Russia, Turkey, the US, and India.

Among other things Ukraine does have growth potential in the gas deposits.

[MusicTurner]

Washington Post has an article today about US intelligence obtaining extremely detailed Russian invasion plans in October 2021, 'The Road to War'. The intel was shared with NATO partners in mid-November, except for the attack on Hostomel Kyiv airport, that only US and Ukraine knew about.

This would obviously further explain those NATO wargames held in November, I mentioned very early in the war, suggesting clearly that Russia would win. Even Italy's army did special wargames about it.

That NATO and Ukraine were afterwards better prepared of course partly explains the unexpected problems faced so far by the Russians.