Europe at War

[SimonNZ]

Timothy Snyder on Ezra Klein's podcast with a large number of opinions and perspectives I haven't encountered elsewhere:

Timothy Snyder on the Myths That Blinded the West to Putin's Plans

also in transcript form via New York Times:

Transcript: Ezra Klein Interviews Timothy Snyder

[BasilValentine]

     They quite clearly thought they had the capacity, and then when Zelensky and co. didn't run away like the Afghans they tried multiple times to kill him.

     Do you think Russia would hold free and fair elections after they killed everyone they tried to kill? What kind of evidence do you need that you don't have?

amw seems to think — or just claims —  that 40 mile long line of armor doubly decimated on the way to Kyiv was just a diversion. Also seems willing to accept Russian estimates of their own casualties.

[drogulus]

     It is imperative that Russia search the entirety of Ukraine for evidence of radiation from the secret nuclear program run by the fascists, because we know such facilities are not located in the Donbass region.

     https://www.youtube.com/v/Kp8IzBClYuo

     This is what the Russian people are being told. Russia must search everywhere (even the west!) to justify being everywhere.

[vandermolen]

I thought that President Biden made a good speech in Warsaw today - best I have heard from him.

[Karl Henning]

I thought that President Biden made a good speech in Warsaw today - best I have heard from him.

Yes.

[amw]

     They quite clearly thought they had the capacity, and then when Zelensky and co. didn't run away like the Afghans they tried multiple times to kill him.

     Do you think Russia would hold free and fair elections after they killed everyone they tried to kill? What kind of evidence do you need that you don't have?

To determine the actual objectives of a war you generally need declassified government documents (which I don't expect us to ever see in Russia's case) or similar. To draw feasible conclusions about the objectives of a war you need to have some idea of both immediate and long-term effects. We have neither at the moment.

That said, while all that we do have is speculation, it is somewhat interesting that prior to the current invasion, foreign policy and politics people rarely if ever floated the idea that Russia would topple Ukraine's government, or even had the military capacity to sustain a large invasion or occupation. Even when Russia's military buildup along the Ukrainian border started (late last year I believe), the "consensus" was that it was planning to invade and occupy territories near Donbas and Crimea, and people "in the know" seemed genuinely surprised (and, imo, rather inappropriately excited) when Russia attacked on a much broader series of fronts. Obviously, since then the new "consensus" has become that Russia is a massive threat and will cause global thermonuclear war etc. But the original assessment was probably more accurate.

I'll point out another comparison: Putin and his supporters regularly do give speeches about Zelensky being some kind of Nazi and how he must be removed at all costs or whatever. While there are claims that Russia has attempted to have him assassinated via hiring mercenaries, with all such attempts failing (obviously), there's a fairly straightforward tool major powers use these days for assassinating foreign enemies during times of war, which is the drone strike. We've seen videos of Russian drones destroying Ukrainian apartment buildings, hospitals, schools, etc., so we know they have this capability. They haven't used it against Zelensky or really any of his inner circle. A similar case has occurred in a rather different country: Syria. Presidents Obama and Trump, along with a number of other major political figures in the USA, regularly gave speeches about Bashar al-Assad being a threat to world peace who must be deposed before the US will agree to withdraw its forces from the country. It's been about eleven years by this point. US and Israeli forces maintained air superiority for most of that time. Assad remains un-drone-struck to this day.

Obviously, there are legal implications associated with assassinating a civilian leader, but for UNSC members international law is more of a suggestion anyway—and, again, the US killed plenty of lower-profile civilians in Syria, and Russia has killed plenty of lower-profile civilians in Ukraine. The explanation: for the USA, some leaked memos attributed to John Kerry suggest that despite American claims, they always intended for Assad to retain power, and simply wanted to make sure he was too weak to accomplish anything contravening American foreign policy, but not weak enough to leave the kind of power vacuum that could result in total civil collapse and threaten the security of Syria's US-allied neighbours (Israel, Jordan, Turkey). This "feels" accurate even if we don't have true confirmation. I think a similar assumption could be made with Ukraine, with Russia fearing a power vacuum on its border more than it fears an unfriendly regime, and mostly hoping to weaken the Ukrainian government without overthrowing it. But time will tell, I guess.

Also seems willing to accept Russian estimates of their own casualties.

Not really, but I could believe that only ~1300 of Russia's KIA were regular RuAF servicemen, with the remaining several thousand-ish being mercenaries and militias.

[Karl Henning]

Of course, we all know that we cannot call it a defeat, unless we have access to classified Russian docs ...

Jennifer Rubin: Russia's actual defeat — not simply a partial victory or one without subjugation of Ukraine — is in the realm of reality. Russia seems to be turning from Kyiv, focusing on the Donbas, two regions of which were under control of Putin surrogates before the invasion. In other words, Putin may soon realize that his dream of rebuilding the Russian empire has failed, at least for now. If he's looking to claim a much smaller victory, count this as a true David and Goliath story, a remarkable triumph of a democratic people.

[drogulus]

     From a business perspective the West shouldn't ignore any of its markets, or allow them to be eaten piecemeal by the competition.    

To determine the actual objectives of a war you generally need declassified government documents (which I don't expect us to ever see in Russia's case) or similar. To draw feasible conclusions about the objectives of a war you need to have some idea of both immediate and long-term effects. We have neither at the moment.

     Why would we need to know the long term effects to determine objectives? The Russian can't hide them, because they are in plain sight. Even their lies about denazification reveal their objective is to remove the "NAZI drug addicts" and replace them with friendly faces. I'm content to leave long term judgment to historians, and determine objectives on the best available data. I don't see another option.

[drogulus]

     When a guy robs a bank it might be for the money but we won't know........awww forget it.

[milk]

This is an interesting interview with a former Putin advisor. He argues that sanctions will have no effect and that Putin only understands military resistance. He gives some interesting recent examples of countries fighting back against Russia and Putin backing down. There's lots of interesting points in this to consider. Question: What actions has Turkey already taken to oppose the Russian invasion? Answer below.

https://youtu.be/hl_nWwx2B7w





* it closed the Bosphorus and Dardanelles straits.

[milk]

The US most certainly should not engage in full scale war with Russia to protect the Baltics, for instance. 

How should the U.S. respond to an invasion of Taiwan by China?

[Todd]

How should the U.S. respond to an invasion of Taiwan by China?

Depends on when it happens.

[milk]

Depends on when it happens.

how about tomorrow?

[LKB]

Depends on when it happens.

No, it doesn't.

The TRA stipulates that the US will provide material assistance to the Taiwanese which will enhance their ability to defend themselves. There is no requirement for the US to intervene directly in Taiwan's defense, and no other agreement requires such action.

Taiwan is densely populated, something like 34 million on the island iirc. When l was there in 1975, every high school had a rifle range and every male 18 or older served at least two years in the military. That requirement has since been eased somewhat, and can now be satisfied by serving in other capacities. But even so, those people have witnessed Tianamen Square and the subjugation of Hong Kong, as well as the genocidal policies impacting the Uyghurs. They're not likely to have any illusions regarding their fate under the communists.

Having been among them, if only for a few weeks, what struck me was how like Americans they were. Ten years behind the US in some ways, but committed to democracy and proud of their unique identity, while still acknowledging their cultural bonds with the mainland.

I don't worry about Taiwan, not for a second, as long as they have access to modern defenses. If the world is surprised at the ability of Ukraine to stymie Putin's Russia, l think they would be astonished at Taiwan's capability to hold off the PRC.

[Todd]

Obviously, there are legal implications associated with assassinating a civilian leader, but for UNSC members international law is more of a suggestion anyway

But for the US, Executive Orders 11905, 12036, and 12333 are binding.  A sitting president may try to issue a new order overriding them, but that is always easier said than done.

The explanation: for the USA, some leaked memos attributed to John Kerry suggest that despite American claims, they always intended for Assad to retain power, and simply wanted to make sure he was too weak to accomplish anything contravening American foreign policy, but not weak enough to leave the kind of power vacuum that could result in total civil collapse and threaten the security of Syria's US-allied neighbours (Israel, Jordan, Turkey). This "feels" accurate even if we don't have true confirmation. I think a similar assumption could be made with Ukraine, with Russia fearing a power vacuum on its border more than it fears an unfriendly regime, and mostly hoping to weaken the Ukrainian government without overthrowing it. But time will tell, I guess.

Destabilization is a tried and true policy choice.

how about tomorrow?

Perhaps start a new topic about a hypothetical war.  Taiwan is not in Europe.

No, it doesn't.

Yes, it does.

[LKB]

Yes, it does.

And again: no, it doesn't.

This is probably a case of you not knowing what you don't know.

[Todd]

And again: no, it doesn't.

This is probably a case of you not knowing what you don't know.

Yes, it does.  The US is currently dealing with the situation in the Ukraine, which limits some policy choices.  A new thread about a hypothetical war is probably a good idea so people can go on about what may or may not happen if/when China invades Taiwan.

[Karl Henning]

And again: no, it doesn't.

This is probably a case of you not knowing what you don't know.

Nor, so far as I can tell, being able to care.

[LKB]

Now, let's not be unkind, Karl.

Todd does care... about his wallet. 

[drogulus]

     

Now, let's not be unkind, Karl.

Todd does care... about his wallet. 

     That's the wrong wallet. Mine is the important one. It depends on the old and new world orders that maintain resilience and battle the pirates at the edge and not in the middle. Forward defense doesn't go obsolete.