Europe at War

[milk]

Putin could lose power before he dies, but that seems unlikely.  But he will not live forever.  Russia is slowly taking more and more territory in Ukraine, and looks likely to achieve at least some of its war aims, despite all the hullabaloo in The West, and all the money and weapons that were thrown away.  People on all sides need to think about what negotiations will look like. 

The West really should think seriously about the risks associated with trying to impose long-term economic hardship on Russia.  There are a variety of potential unpleasant outcomes.  One is a more destabilized Russia where Putin's replacement, sooner or later, is even more informed by nationalism and anti-Western thinking, and still has a massive military and nuclear arsenal at his disposal.  Another very bad outcome is that keeping Russia under severe sanctions for years or decades could backfire, leading to further and then accelerating weakening of the dollar, a more widespread shift to using other currencies for energy trading, and the long-threatened establishment of an alternative to SWIFT, be it CIPS or something else.  Many countries are content to buy Russian energy despite US demands not to, and more will do so as it becomes clear that even the US does not really have the power to unilaterally impose its will.  Most of the world is lukewarm or hostile to the policies pursued to bolster the "rules-based order".  China and India, comprising a few billion people, are happy to work with Russia.  Many other countries are as well.  And duplicitous Europeans bypass sanctions and happily work with Russia as well.  See the story about shipping companies.  Continuation of current trends will see the erosion of American influence, power, and policy options.  The American Empire may accelerate its own diminution.  (The US is too powerful and wealthy to simply disappear anytime soon, so I cannot say it will lead to its own demise.)  The United States has overextended itself militarily, given practical political limits (ie, full-scale mobilization is not possible) and economically.  Fortunately for Americans alive today, China will not replace the US as a global hegemon with unchallenged reach since the US exists, and the transition away from even the current level of US global dominance will take decades, so many Americans can continue to believe in America's greatness for years to come.  I mean, it's not like the US is a European country, or anything that dire.

Is this steel-manning the other side? Yes. You have a strong argument. I'm sure there's an counter argument to be made.

The Chinese have been watching and learning what happens in Ukraine, and now that the US essentially revealed the extent of its economic warfare tools, and how far it is willing to go (eg, involving central banks), the Chinese can prepare.  That was a large blunder on the part of the US. 

Does China need resources from the outside to keep its economy going?

[drogulus]

     It's better to do now what will otherwise be done later at a higher cost in Poland and the Baltic states. These countries can be saved from the fate of Ukraine, but only if we give up on the idea that defending Europe is somehow riskier than not defending it. As for all the associated bad outcomes, they are here and will continue.

Does China need resources from the outside to keep its economy going?

    Yes, they need food, dollars to buy it, and skilled workers to work cheap like it's 1999. At least Russia has food.

[milk]

     It's better to do now what will otherwise be done later at a higher cost in Poland and the Baltic states. These countries can be saved from the fate of Ukraine, but only if we give up on the idea that defending Europe is somehow riskier than not defending it. As for all the associated bad outcomes, they are here and will continue.

    Yes, they need food, dollars to buy it, and skilled workers to work cheap like it's 1999. At least Russia has food.

I rather think they cannot totally sanction-proof their economy. I know it's true that they own a lot of pieces of economies around Asia and Africa. But I wonder if the upside to all this is that countries like Vietnam will keep strengthening their ties with the U.S. At the same time, they (the Chinese leadership and their internet trolls) are unloved and forever complaining for it. Maybe they can't really afford to do much more than bluster? Are they willing to roll the dice? If China moves on Taiwan, I think the choice that the U.S., Japan, and other countries have is stark.

[Que]

     It's better to do now what will otherwise be done later at a higher cost in Poland and the Baltic states. These countries can be saved from the fate of Ukraine, but only if we give up on the idea that defending Europe is somehow riskier than not defending it. As for all the associated bad outcomes, they are here and will continue.

Amen to that.

The US can, with significant economic and military strain.  The UK and France have significant enough assets so that they can directly assist, and regional partners can assist, but other European countries in general can do nothing in such a war, other than follow along with US sanctions and perhaps send token forces to show solidarity, for what that's worth.  Which is basically nothing.

Judging individual European countries on their military "usefulness" is a denial of the fact the Europe as a whole is a key element in the global system from which the US derives its wealth and power. Yes, as I acknowledged before, China is going to be a  (even) larger threat. But thay doesn't make fending off the Russian threat less important, on the contrary.

As Europeans we are fortunate to have Biden in power. The Republicans under Trump would have dropped Ukraine - and the rest of Europe - like a brick. And they still will, once they get back in power. Europe needs to prepare for that moment.

[Todd]

Judging individual European countries on their military "usefulness" is a denial of the fact the Europe as a whole is a key element in the global system from which the US derives its wealth and power. Yes, as I acknowledged before, China is going to be a  (even) larger threat.

In the context of combat operations, military power is the primary determinant of an ally's value, and only allies that field men and matériel are useful in this context.  The secondary determinant of an ally's value is the ability to provide significant economic support beyond military support.  Most European countries fail completely in both areas, and only a small number maintain an ability to project power at all, and then only with logistical support from the US.  The primary defensive value most European countries represent is a captive market for US military gear. 

The US does exploit European markets, as it should, and it does continue to occupy the continent, as it looks like it unfortunately must, but from an economic standpoint Europe is one market, and the costs associated with the current international system are growing, and as the current war demonstrates, the possibility of yet another European war acts as a drain on US resources and as a distraction from more important long-term concerns.

But thay doesn't make fending off the Russian threat less important, on the contrary.

From the standpoint of US national security, Russian military actions of the 21st Century have not put the US in danger, nor have Russian economic policies had the same type of impact to US economic interests in some areas as have Chinese economic policies.  China is more important to US security and economic well-being than Russia right now, and its importance will only continue to grow, while Russia's slowly declines.  US policy makers were wise to diversify sources of critical resources, including all forms of imported energy, significantly reducing reliance on any one nation for physical supply, even if global pricing does potentially impact the cost of energy temporarily.  Europeans never learned that lesson, and Europeans confuse their security for US security.  Unfortunately, some US policymakers still confuse European security and US security, too.  They are not the same thing.

As has been the case since 2014, no one has explained why Ukraine is particularly important to the US.  Why are the tens of thousands of dead Ukrainians more important to the US than the hundreds of thousands of dead Yemeni? 

As Europeans we are fortunate to have Biden in power. The Republicans under Trump would have dropped Ukraine - and the rest of Europe - like a brick. And they still will, once they get back in power. Europe needs to prepare for that moment.

This response perfectly demonstrates Europe's complete dependence on the US for security, and it also misjudges the militarism of both American parties, as well as US politics more generally.  People forget or never knew that under Obama the US did not even provide material support to Ukraine, which began only under Trump, and at the same time Trump is, in Chomsky's words, the only world statesman who put forth an actual path to negotiated settlement of the Russo-Ukrainian War.  It is understandable why people don't address these facts.  They show that the politics are more complex.  Remove Trump from the picture, and the policy response changes.  A more conventional Republican president with a more traditional national security team - let's say a President DeSantis and Secretary of Defense Cotton - would likely be more bellicose than the Biden administration.  There is no chance they would be less so.  Both US parties are war parties, and the few voices for restraint are basically marginalized.  As an example, look at the support for the foolish, unnecessary expansion of NATO in Congress.

It would of course be far preferable for the US to expend far less in defense of the wealthiest, highest income region of the world.  But that will likely not happen anytime soon.  As the war has progressed, growing splits in policy approaches in the European continent have appeared, and hopes for massive new outlays and a new military policy in Europe have waned since the excitable first weeks of the war, when rhetoric flourished and promises came cheaper than normal.  Same old, same old.

[Todd]

Pope Francis again suggests NATO may have provoked Russian war in Ukraine

[71 dB]

Erdogan probably wants to hinder Sweden and Finland joining NATO until elections next year. It seems he plans to win the election by bragging about blocking Sweden and Finland to his mislead supporters and then after the election victory change his tone, because the rest of the NATO won't allow Turkey to dictate alone how NATO expands.

[Todd]

Putin's stagflation revenge: Everyone said his war would destroy Russia's economy but he's killing America's too

Looks like the war is having the unexpected (?) consequence of improperly redefining economic concepts and terms.  Oh well.  (Mark Zandi's "analysis", very well-timed and media savvy, somehow left out fifteen years of lax monetary policy and over two years of excessive fiscal stimulus as the real causes of inflation, but there you go.)  At least the article points out the self-harming nature of the sanctions imposed on Russia.

[drogulus]

     US profits from a well defended Europe are considerable. Buying and selling between and among system partners bootstraps everyone to greater affluence.

     The notion that the relationship between the US and its alliance partners is a burden comes under what I call the "fallacy of absolute cost". The fallacy claims that dollars spent on ideologically unloved purposes cease to function like other dollars once they arrive in the hands of whoever gets them to, say, defend Estonia or pay the medical bills of a formerly uninsured poor person. Unlike other dollars they somehow don't continue circulating through the economy. It's not just that the checks are not cashed, the funds disappear completely!

     It's important that the claim be more like a buried premise. The fact that benefits and costs of defending the world economic system are intertwined the way they are might expose some arguments to more clarity than they can tolerate.

[Todd]

From the Gray Lady: French Nuclear Power Crisis Frustrates Europe's Push to Quit Russian Energy

Cheech and Chong were right, things are tough all over.

[LKB]

From the Gray Lady: French Nuclear Power Crisis Frustrates Europe's Push to Quit Russian Energy

Cheech and Chong were right, things are tough all over.

And yet, their collective career was up in smoke decades ago ( can't resist a pun, even if it groans ).

[Karl Henning]

And yet, their collective career was up in smoke decades ago ( can't resist a pun, even if it groans ).

And of course, before Cheech and Chong, there were Pico and Alvarado:

[Todd]

NATO leader says Ukraine war against Russia could last for 'years': Live updates

Mr Stoltenberg does not instill confidence.  The war has already been going on for years.  There is no rational basis to think it will end soon.  The West is dead set against a negotiated settlement. 

[Johnnie Burgess]

Amen to that.


Judging individual European countries on their military "usefulness" is a denial of the fact the Europe as a whole is a key element in the global system from which the US derives its wealth and power. Yes, as I acknowledged before, China is going to be a  (even) larger threat. But thay doesn't make fending off the Russian threat less important, on the contrary.

As Europeans we are fortunate to have Biden in power. The Republicans under Trump would have dropped Ukraine - and the rest of Europe - like a brick. And they still will, once they get back in power. Europe needs to prepare for that moment.

Biden was a great help to Afghanistan.

[Que]

Biden was a great help to Afghanistan.

The war in Afghanistan was started by the Bush administration, just like that other war you dislike so much (and rightfully so): the one in Iraq.

[Que]

The issue of Kaliningrad has come up sooner than I expected:

Russia threatens retaliation as Lithuania bans goods transit to Kaliningrad


But a strategically located Russian enclave of non-Russian origin that is surrounded by NATO territory was bound to become an issue at some point...

What looms in the background is Russian anxiety about the prospect of their Baltic Fleet, which has a base in Kaliningrad, being surrounded by NATO after Sweden and Finland join the alliance.

[Madiel]

Pussy Riot points out that Tchaikovsky didn't invade Ukraine:

https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/jun/21/cutting-works-by-russian-artists-is-stupid-says-pussy-riot-member

[Todd]

What looms in the background is Russian anxiety about the prospect of their Baltic Fleet, which has a base in Kaliningrad, being surrounded by NATO after Sweden and Finland join the alliance.

Which is a legitimate concern for Russia.  The concern for Russia will be an expanded, rotating deployment of US Navy vessels, not the Swedish or Finnish navies.  The tough guy stance being taken by The West may also be more directly challenged in the Baltics than anywhere else in NATO, and not just because of Kaliningrad.  Unless the US deploys carriers and amphibious assault ships on a continual basis, or deploys large numbers of troops to the region, there is nothing the US can do if the Russians move on Baltic capitals.  (NATO sans US military power is of course useless.)  Nukes are an option, I guess.

Multiple Russian business interests are looking to move their current European headquarters to Turkey.  Many Swedes and Finns are loathe to accept Turkey's legitimate concerns, though NATO leadership is more realistic.  Swedish and Finnish membership may very well come down to who can offer Turkey the largest bribes.

And all the while, Ukrainians continue to suffer and die as The West continues to provide weapons and eschew meaningful settlement talks.  The West may just be willing to fight Russia to the last Ukrainian.

[Madiel]

Oh right, because the Ukrainians don't keep explicitly asking for Western support. It's just being forced upon them involuntarily and the weapons go off automatically. 

[Todd]

US fighters 'to be held accountable'

I wonder if the official position of the US government will be that US mercenaries are not really mercenaries. 

Sorry, I meant "volunteers".