Europe at War

[milk]

Can you define the word "victory" for this war?

 

First, even assuming a practical definition of "victory" can be arrived at, Ukrainian victory (or rather, the short-term triumph of American Imperialism) is unlikely to have a material impact on relations with China.  Russia and the United States are declining powers, while China is a rising power.  China's continued rise in power is more broadly based, with direct and massive involvement in the existing international economic system, and on a far larger scale than Russia has ever achieved.  Economic development and the rise and fall of powers is not linear, of course, and there will be bumps along the way, but the sheer scale of Chinese power makes it quite different than Russia. 

Second, I am unclear what the "cause against China" is, but the language is informed by the crusader mentality that is so deeply ingrained in much western foreign policy.  That is, only The West is fit to rule the world.  Which, of course, is untrue.  China does not offer the type of systemic challenge that the USSR did in that it is not trying to either offer an alternative economic system or assume the role of the current dominant power within the (eroding) system, but rather it is building economic and political ties with countries all around the world, including right into Europe.  True, the relationships are unbalanced, in favor of China, which is an approach favored by the US as well.  A more incremental approach, one that relies on building economic and political ties before expanding into military action, is a more measured approach.  Given that China has primarily emphasized reabsorbing Taiwan and dominion over seas bearing the name of China as short- and medium-term objectives, the objectives themselves are limited.  Sure, China can become more expansionist and attempt to build out a network of global military bases to counter the power of the US, but that seems unlikely this decade or next.  First China has to address Taiwan and develop a blue water navy capability to rival the US.  That will take until the 2040s, unless there is a full-scale war before then.  Let's assume all this happens. Even then, one must ask the big question: So?

I'm hesitant to define what Ukrainian victory means. What are Russia's objectives? You can probably say with much more precision than me. I'm assuming there's a list of specific ways that Russia needs to keep its influence over the Ukraine and that it could negotiate for those things. I'm also assuming they'd include getting rid of Zekenski. Here's a question: is the invasion of the Ukraine an act that any rational Russian leader would or could do? Or is it something only a monster like Putin would do?
I take your point about China. That's certainly one way of looking at it, although, some of those seas bearing China's name have other names as well. Maybe that sounds like a quibble. I doubt Chinese ships are the only ones sailing through them.
I don't know about "is informed." It may sound like that to you as far as the operation of my mind. The cause for me is just to keep China cautious about using its military power, to keep it from being a bully. It all really depends on what everyone's intentions and capabilities really are. My mind is open as far as not wanting to throw away lives on un-winnable causes. That's a tenant of Just War Theory (as far as that's worth). But I do see Russia and China as noxious. I don't think it's a "crusader" thing at all actually. Look around Asia. I'm trying to think of where "people on the street" like the Chinese government. Not Vietnam. Not India or Sri Lanka or Laos. Not Japan. Of course not South Korea. Maybe there is somewhere. Maybe Singapore where there's a large Chinese-speaking population. But China isn't only butting heads about territory (land/ocean) with India, Japan, The Philippines and Vietnam, it's also got problems with Malaysia. It also sees its popularity tested in Indonesia.
I get your view that China is on the rise and so what, why get hot and bothered about it, etc. It's worth considering whether it's worth it to spend any kind of resources butting up against that. Maybe it is or maybe it isn't.

Taiwan seems different to me, but I don't know about the details much. Isn't it much denser than Ukraine, in terms of population? I just can't imagine what a military conflict will look like there, especially if the U.S. and Japan actually get involved. I can't even believe it's possible for Japan to enter into a military conflict with China and it's probably horrifying to so many people in Japan but if the LDP do change the Japanese constitution and the U.S. gets into that conflict, it seems unavoidable.

[Pohjolas Daughter]

'A bit of a problem' including offering convicts, also murderers, the possibility to be released and get money for participating in the war (apparently 1500 so far); and mercenary groups like Wagner being finally recognised as military groups that also participate officially, besides just doing the other dirty or covert jobs they've specialized in before.

Overall, the Russian losses and soldiers have very much been from the outer, poorer provinces - another means of trying to keep the middle or well-off classes somewhat less troubled by the war.

Convicts?! 

PD

[Karl Henning]

Convicts?! 

PD

A Stalinist throwback: Да.

[Pohjolas Daughter]

A Stalinist throwback: Да.

[drogulus]

     Crimea go boom again.

I'm hesitant to define what Ukrainian victory means. 

     Defining it doesn't matter. Ukraine is conducting a special operation against armed Russian tourists.

[Que]

Convicts?! 

PD

Reportedly rapists and pedophiles are deemed ineligible... but murderers are not a problem.

[BasilValentine]

Reportedly rapists and pedophiles are deemed ineligible... but murderers are not a problem.

The army already has enough rapists and murderers deployed — reportedly.

[Todd]

I'm hesitant to define what Ukrainian victory means....is the invasion of the Ukraine an act that any rational Russian leader would or could do? Or is it something only a monster like Putin would do?

No one has really defined what victory for either side looks like to a satisfactory degree.  The non-specialist (ie, non-academic, non-government) foreign policy journals mostly posit Russian control of portions of eastern Ukraine and continued control of Crimea as a success of sorts for Russia, but one can say that would be a success or failure, depending on political objectives.  Unconditional surrender, or even conditional surrender of Russia with onerous terms, is exceedingly unlikely, as is Ukraine returning to pre-2014 borders.

Since Putin is the Russian leader, we are left with Putin's actions as opposed to an alternate leader.  Guessing what another monster or non-monster would have done would be contrafactual, though multiple sources with first-hand experience with Russian politicians all indicate that expansionist US policy, particularly pertaining to Ukraine, has always been viewed as threatening.  When a country is under threat, it is not uncommon for the country to take some type of action, though a large-scale invasion may not be pursued. 

I don't think it's a "crusader" thing at all actually.

The crusader mentality in US foreign policy can alternately be described as the Messianic (rooted in Wilsonian thought) or Maximalist (Richard Haass' formulation) approach, whereby the US sets out to promote and even force democracy, capitalism, and supposed "Western Values" on other states.  The specific outlook of other powers does not really matter quite so much if they are aligned with the US, or at the very least subservient to the "rules-based order" enforced by the US.  China has become powerful enough so that it can begin to challenge the existing order, though it still participates quite fully in the established economic framework.  It would be rather unusual for China to not seek to change certain aspects of the existing international order.  It would be unusual for the US to cede power willingly and without war.  Were the US actually exceptional, it might.

Any war over Taiwan would be brutal and costly.  However many civilian deaths war games may estimate, the actual figures would be higher.  One must consider whether the human toll, the military cost, and the economic cost of a potential war in Taiwan is worth it.  Certainly, the Taiwanese may accept hundreds of thousands or millions of dead Taiwanese and years of economic ruin to remain independent - at least for a while.  That is their prerogative.  Taiwanese independence is not worth any American lives.

[Que]

The army already has enough rapists and murderers deployed — reportedly.

Good point. I guess there is no logic to madness.

[Jo498]

To invoke "madness" is just lazy and stupid, sorry. It was obvious and had been announced many times that Russia would not tolerate a "turning" of Ukraine (neither of Belarus). When the West did this 8 years ago, the conflict became hot. It's not that complicated.
The puzzling/interesting thing is that the conflict remained local (Crimea and Eastern Ukraine) with the West not really caring any more for most of the last 8 years. Then whatever happened in last fall (stationing of NATO weapons or something similar, like lots of "military advisors" in the Ukraine) apparently led to Russia taking to the ultima ratio regum again, with "the West" not ready for this, mostly because of their dependence on Russian fuel etc.

Now the European leaders (incl. the most despicable bunch heading Germany since 1945) is apparently obeying their US masters in ruining their population's wealth and energy security by idiotic embargoes that hurts Russia very little, (parts of) Europe a lot but gives good business opportunties for US LNG etc.

The US seems to be happy to ruin Europe and expend Ukrainian lives as long as it hurts Russia considerably. Because they will need the dwindling power of their crumbling Empire to stall China in the Pacific and don't want to expend too much in Europe. That's all fine, just part of great game realpolitik but the Europeans should not be as stupid as they are and do their bidding. I don't hope for serious trouble with gas etc in winter but it seems to be necessary for the Europeans to wake up. Ukraine (with no possible "victory condition") is not worth ruining the rest of the continent.

[Que]

To invoke "madness" is just lazy and stupid, sorry.

Well, thank you. I think you misread/misunderstood, since "madness" was only referring to the recruitment of convicts.

[JBS]

To invoke "madness" is just lazy and stupid, sorry. It was obvious and had been announced many times that Russia would not tolerate a "turning" of Ukraine (neither of Belarus). When the West did this 8 years ago, the conflict became hot. It's not that complicated.
The puzzling/interesting thing is that the conflict remained local (Crimea and Eastern Ukraine) with the West not really caring any more for most of the last 8 years. Then whatever happened in last fall (stationing of NATO weapons or something similar, like lots of "military advisors" in the Ukraine) apparently led to Russia taking to the ultima ratio regum again, with "the West" not ready for this, mostly because of their dependence on Russian fuel etc.

Now the European leaders (incl. the most despicable bunch heading Germany since 1945) is apparently obeying their US masters in ruining their population's wealth and energy security by idiotic embargoes that hurts Russia very little, (parts of) Europe a lot but gives good business opportunties for US LNG etc.

The US seems to be happy to ruin Europe and expend Ukrainian lives as long as it hurts Russia considerably. Because they will need the dwindling power of their crumbling Empire to stall China in the Pacific and don't want to expend too much in Europe. That's all fine, just part of great game realpolitik but the Europeans should not be as stupid as they are and do their bidding. I don't hope for serious trouble with gas etc in winter but it seems to be necessary for the Europeans to wake up. Ukraine (with no possible "victory condition") is not worth ruining the rest of the continent.

So you'd be content to have Germany become a vassal of Russia again?
Because that's the Putinist vision: a renewed Soviet empire.

[Todd]

So you'd be content to have Germany become a vassal of Russia again?
Because that's the Putinist vision: a renewed Soviet empire.

A classic false dichotomy.

[rhomboid]

Death toll: 200 soldiers per day.
This is totally insane.

[JBS]

A classic false dichotomy.

I'm merely be as objective and clearheaded as you claim to be.

[Todd]

I'm merely be as objective and clearheaded as you claim to be.

Got it.

[drogulus]

     I don't see the US forcing Germany to correct its vastly stupid energy blunder. The easy course for them turned out very badly. If the US really was the big bully it would have not permitted Germany to stupidly throw away its own security. Bad US!! Don't you know how to suzerain?

[milk]

No one has really defined what victory for either side looks like to a satisfactory degree.  The non-specialist (ie, non-academic, non-government) foreign policy journals mostly posit Russian control of portions of eastern Ukraine and continued control of Crimea as a success of sorts for Russia, but one can say that would be a success or failure, depending on political objectives.  Unconditional surrender, or even conditional surrender of Russia with onerous terms, is exceedingly unlikely, as is Ukraine returning to pre-2014 borders.

Since Putin is the Russian leader, we are left with Putin's actions as opposed to an alternate leader.  Guessing what another monster or non-monster would have done would be contrafactual, though multiple sources with first-hand experience with Russian politicians all indicate that expansionist US policy, particularly pertaining to Ukraine, has always been viewed as threatening.  When a country is under threat, it is not uncommon for the country to take some type of action, though a large-scale invasion may not be pursued. 


The crusader mentality in US foreign policy can alternately be described as the Messianic (rooted in Wilsonian thought) or Maximalist (Richard Haass' formulation) approach, whereby the US sets out to promote and even force democracy, capitalism, and supposed "Western Values" on other states.  The specific outlook of other powers does not really matter quite so much if they are aligned with the US, or at the very least subservient to the "rules-based order" enforced by the US.  China has become powerful enough so that it can begin to challenge the existing order, though it still participates quite fully in the established economic framework.  It would be rather unusual for China to not seek to change certain aspects of the existing international order.  It would be unusual for the US to cede power willingly and without war.  Were the US actually exceptional, it might.

Any war over Taiwan would be brutal and costly.  However many civilian deaths war games may estimate, the actual figures would be higher.  One must consider whether the human toll, the military cost, and the economic cost of a potential war in Taiwan is worth it.  Certainly, the Taiwanese may accept hundreds of thousands or millions of dead Taiwanese and years of economic ruin to remain independent - at least for a while.  That is their prerogative.  Taiwanese independence is not worth any American lives.

I think it's worth considering what you're saying. I'd just like to steel man the opposing arguments. Unfortunately, I'm not the best one for the job. I'm not sure why being aligned with the U.S. makes countries irrelevant but I have to read/understand more on the topic. China will suffer a population decline like Japan, but I don't know enough to challenge your claim that its rise to dominance is inevitable. Certainly it will grow in influence as it has. But how much? At least there must be variables in the future. I assume India is a variable as are all the big economies in the region.
I'm interested in the back and forth-s on these topics as I learn a lot that way.

[drogulus]

     China has a far worse population crisis than Japan. The best that can be said is the Chinese won't go extinct.

[Todd]

I'm not sure why being aligned with the U.S. makes countries irrelevant but I have to read/understand more on the topic.

In the post-war and post-Cold War eras, the only allies that have pursued a foreign policy not in near-perfect alignment overall with the US are France and Turkey, and only Turkey has pursued policies sometimes directly and actively at odds with US interests.  Only a handful of countries allied with the US matter or even have the capacity to matter.  Economic power and military power - that is, hard power - ultimately determine the ability to influence events.  (Soft power is emphasized by those who lack hard power.)  Were Europe to formulate a consolidated, unified foreign policy with concomitant military power, it could act as a counterweight to the US, but Europeans can't even get monetary policy locked in properly.

China will suffer a population decline like Japan, but I don't know enough to challenge your claim that its rise to dominance is inevitable.

I have never written that China will rise to dominance.  China is rising, India is rising, the US is declining, Russia is declining, European powers are declining.  Some African countries have the capacity to become significant regional players as well, though that will take decades.  (Perhaps Saudi Arabia or even Iran can become more influential, but the source of their income and wealth will become less significant in the next several decades, and unless they transition to more diversified economies, they will ultimately decline rapidly.)  The world is moving toward multipolarity more akin to what existed in centuries past.  Since so many people have become accustomed to a single country possessing such disproportionate power, many people appear to naturally conclude the next eighty years will be like the last eighty.  The last eighty years are historically anomalous.  This will become more clear as non-western powers become more influential, first regionally, then globally.  Many Americans, in particular, will have great difficulty adjusting.