Some aspects I love about the Christian religion

[DavidRoss]

Why is theism (perhaps we must define it? ) rational but atheism irrational?

To simplify: theism = belief that God exists; atheism = belief that God does not exist.  To be rational, belief in God's existence must be inferred from evidence, of which there is no dearth.  Atheism, on the other hand, implies a claim of omniscience--and since there is no evidence, credible or otherwise, that anyone has such comprehensive knowledge, it is simply absurd.

In my opinion, the "bonkers" part is claiming knowledge or truth about the existence or non-existence of "things" for which there is no known evidence. The lack of tangible evidence is why I do not believe; along the same lines, the lack of evidence that there is no god is why I have never attempted to assert that position with certainty. That said, I don't consider the two propositions (1. There is a god or gods; 2. There is/are no god(s)) equally probable (I don't regard it as a 50-50 scenario). That's why I call myself an atheist rather than an agnostic, although (again) this comes down to semantics/definitions.

But I don't think that knowledge and belief are the same. Religious belief is not something I can personally relate to, but there is a qualitative difference between regarding one's religious beliefs as faith-based and regarding one's religious beliefs as evidence-based (more along the lines of knowledge). The former I find peculiar (because I cannot relate to it) but not "bonkers"; the latter I find somewhat "bonkers" (or at the very least a completely untenable position).

But definitions are crucial. I would not presume to put words into DR's mouth keyboard, so I eagerly await his response, which I trust will be articulate and fun to read! 

Why, thank you!  How gracious of you to say! 

Note: All knowledge, except for direct experience (and even that may be iffy!), is based on faith.
        Understanding ≠ knowing.
        Religiosity ≠ spirituality.

Is there anything more crippling to our minds, to our capacity to learn and understand and grow, anything more certain to condemn us to everlasting ignorance, than the phrase "I know?"
       

[aquablob]

Is there anything more crippling to our minds, to our capacity to learn and understand and grow, anything more certain to condemn us to everlasting ignorance, than the phrase "I know?"

I definitely agree with you here.

To be rational, belief in God's existence must be inferred from evidence, of which there is no dearth.

Why?  Ok, maybe you find it bonkers because you aren't personally convinced by the evidence presented or offered, but wouldn't you agree that at least providing some kind of proof for a religious conviction is better than not giving one at all?  It seems that the other approach is far more blind (and, perhaps, dangerous).  Maybe I'm misunderstanding what you wrote. (It happens a lot to me--bear kindly if so!)

I have never encountered true, testable evidence that would indicate the existence of any deities (let alone a specific one that we "know" something about). Perhaps "evidence" is another term that must be defined. When I had a conversation with a good friend who was studying in a seminary, he indicated to me that he considered as evidence his "personal revelations." Some Muslims would point to the Koran, some Christians to the Bible, as evidence.

Fair enough, but let's be honest: this type of "evidence" is, of course, convincing only to those who assume the existence of their god in the first place. In other words, this kind of "evidence" is untestable and only indicates how things *might* be if we make some far-reaching fundamental assumptions.

I would require the same type of evidence one would use in formulating a theory in the sciences. Yes, there are plenty of religious scientists, but I've never encountered one that treats one's belief in god in the same way one treats one's belief in Einstein's theory of general relativity. The latter, supported by testable empirical evidence thus far, is closer to "knowledge" than "faith," but will be abandoned completely if new, contradictory empirical evidence comes to light. The former is not treated to the same type of scrutiny, and no religious scientist I've spoken with claims that it is. It's a different type of belief, one that requires no "empirical" evidence, and as such is closer to "faith" than "knowledge."

(And I make these statements without yet having heard either Bu's or DR's conceptions of evidence for the existence of god; I welcome elaboration from either/both of you!)

Which brings me to:

Note: All knowledge, except for direct experience (and even that may be iffy!), is based on faith.
        Understanding ≠ knowing.
        Religiosity ≠ spirituality.

I oversimplified the situation in a previous post, but I would say that there is a spectrum between "faith" and "knowledge." One can never truly know anything with 100% certainty, but there are degrees of relative surety. For example, I can state with a high degree of confidence that I am currently typing on a computer. It's right in front of me, I can see it, I can hear it, I can feel it, and I have typed on it many times before (or so I think! ). Ultimately, though, I cannot prove with 100% certainty that this computer is not, in fact, just a mirage. It's totally possible, and in that sense, my "belief" in my computer's existence is, as you say, based somewhat on faith. But there is no empirical evidence to support this conclusion, so I do not assume it to be the case. On the spectrum between "faith" and "knowledge," I would place my belief in my computer's existence very close to the "knowledge" extreme—but never all the way!

On the other hand, I believe that George W. Bush will go down in history as a poor president. Even though his approval ratings were quite low, only time can tell for sure. At this point, I'm going on far less empirical data than in the previous example, but I at least have the evidence of his low approval ratings, and past presidents with low approval ratings have tended to be viewed negatively later on. Perhaps history will be kinder to W. than I think, but I doubt it. On the spectrum between "faith" and "knowledge," this is pretty far on the "faith" end, but I would say not all the way. Yes, I am speculating, but I have at least a little bit of empirical data that backs my assertion.

Now I think you'll agree with me that regarding the existence or non-existence of something completely undetectable by our senses, the logical default position is that of non-belief. To sway a logical person to believe in the existence of such a thing requires either direct empirical evidence or indirect evidence that forces one, through deduction, to conclude that the thing's existence is likely. The deduction method will probably result in a belief more on the "faith" side of the spectrum than the "knowledge" side, whereas the direct empirical evidence brings us closer to the "knowledge" end of the spectrum.

I believe, for example, that life exists elsewhere in the universe. I have no direct empirical evidence to support this conclusion. What I have is indirect evidence: there are trillions upon trillions upon trillions of star systems throughout the known universe, we've recently begun to find planets here and there orbiting stars other than our own, there is life in our solar system, and the laws of physics in other star systems are (so far as we know) the same as in our own. According to this indirect evidence, we can deduce that there is a good chance of life existing elsewhere in the universe. Without some direct empirical evidence, however, such a belief is nowhere near the "knowledge" end of the spectrum.

Because I've seen no empirical evidence of the existence of any deities, I do not believe with any degree of certainty that any of them exist. Neither have I seen indirect evidence that forces me, through deduction, to conclude that some god(s) most likely exist; I therefore have no reason to believe in their existence at all.

Anyway, I'd be very interested to hear what others consider "evidence." I find these conversations (as long as they remain civil!) quite stimulating. They can also be exhausting, though, and I will not feel slighted in the least if nobody chooses to continue the discussion.

[DavidRoss]

Knowledge that you are typing on a computer is based on direct experience--as is the knowledge of God's presence shared by millions of people from a variety of religious faiths and no faith at all.  Their testimony is evidence, just like your spouse's testimony regarding what happened at work.  The order of nature that is the focus of "hard" scientific inquiry is evidence.  The very existence of something rather than nothing is evidence.

On this site I've seen many whose objections to God hinge on an extraordinarily limited and confining conception of God.  They think that the referent of "God" can only be some magically powerful bearded desert patriarch seated in a comfy club chair in the clouds and intervening in the affairs of men from time to time to cause Bill Buckner to boot a routine ground ball...or some other variant of "the flying spaghetti monster" they love to tack onto such discussions.  Because they think such a conception of God (Red Sox hating patriarch or flying spaghetti monster) is improbable, they deny the existence of God.  Why they think the problem is with God or the millions who see evidence of God all around them, rather with their own pathetically limited and closed-minded conception is...well, sadly obvious, isn't it?

If they rid themselves of their prejudices and look at the question freshly with minds open to seeing the matter through others' eyes (in other words, if they applied the same willingness to learn that they apply to other matters, say, classical music or subatomic physics or the effect of the designated hitter rule), they might be surprised to discover that they've been both right and wrong all along.

[aquablob]

Definitions, again! 

Define "God," then?

[DavidRoss]

Definitions, again! 

Define "God," then?

Not possible.  As the "religious" thinkers in virtually all traditions I'm familiar with agree, God cannot be defined.  Any God small enough for me to define ain't big enough to be God.  Terms like "first principle," "prime mover," "ground of all being," or "grandfather spirit" serve as signposts pointing the way to a broader conception while acknowledging the intrinsic absurdity of itty-bitty finite beings defining the ultimate source of all existence.  Those who imagine that human imagination is up to the task must have very small imaginations, indeed!

[aquablob]

Not possible.  As the "religious" thinkers in virtually all traditions I'm familiar with agree, God cannot be defined.  Any God small enough for me to define ain't big enough to be God.  Terms like "first principle," "prime mover," "ground of all being," or "grandfather spirit" serve as signposts pointing the way to a broader conception while acknowledging the intrinsic absurdity of itty-bitty finite beings defining the ultimate source of all existence.  Those who imagine that human imagination is up to the task must have very small imaginations, indeed!

Fair enough, and I must admit that I've always found beauty in that philosophy (although I am not an adherent).

I hope you won't mind me pointing out, then, the weakness (from the agnostic's or "non-believer's" perspective) in asserting that the theist's position is on the side of evidence/rationality/reason. The position seems to be that A.) God is undefinable, B.) God exists, and C.) the evidence that God exists is everywhere.

But if one cannot (and can never) define God, then how can one interpret anything (or everything, if you prefer ) as evidence for the existence of God?

I guess I'm still not convinced that, on the "faith"-"knowledge" spectrum, this type of belief escapes the "faith" extreme. For one thing (as I've already said), I have found neither direct empirical evidence nor indirect evidence that would lead me to deduce the likely existence of a deity or deities. But more fundamentally, it seems that a "thing's" undefinability precludes logical determination of whether observations/facts are or are not evidence for its existence. Such dialogue, I think, requires at least a basic, agreed-upon definition.

(Or maybe I am just a square who lacks imagination. Anyway, it's been an interesting discussion, even if we have reached an impasse. I appreciate your replies.)

[aquablob]

P.S. On second thought, I'm not sure that I buy my argument that undefinability precludes the type of discourse I described. I think there are plenty of "things" that exist for which no clear-cut definition has been agreed upon.

[orbital]

P.S. On second thought, I'm not sure that I buy my argument that undefinability precludes the type of discourse I described. I think there are plenty of "things" that exist for which no clear-cut definition has been agreed upon.

But do any of these "things" defy definition? or is it just that their definitions are relative?

[aquablob]

But do any of these "things" defy definition? or is it just that their definitions are relative?

Not possible.  As the "religious" thinkers in virtually all traditions I'm familiar with agree, God cannot be defined.  Any God small enough for me to define ain't big enough to be God.  Terms like "first principle," "prime mover," "ground of all being," or "grandfather spirit" serve as signposts pointing the way to a broader conception while acknowledging the intrinsic absurdity of itty-bitty finite beings defining the ultimate source of all existence.  Those who imagine that human imagination is up to the task must have very small imaginations, indeed!

But if one cannot (and can never) define God, then how can one interpret anything (or everything, if you prefer ) as evidence for the existence of God?

It seems that a "thing's" undefinability precludes logical determination of whether observations/facts are or are not evidence for its existence. Such dialogue, I think, requires at least a basic, agreed-upon definition.

On third thought, I believe the issue is not undefinability but rather inconceivability. "Music," for example, is not easily defined, but it's easily conceived of. I think DR's post (and I hope I'm not putting words into his mouth) implies not just the undefinability but also the inconceivability of God.

So substitute "define" and "undefinability" with "conceive of" and "inconceivability" in my previous post.

[Florestan]

    I'm glad to acknowledge the grandfather.

Thank you.

I'm merely saying that discarding the apriorism behind the idea that there could be a theological refutation of physical theories was part of the development process for which the Church ought to be given credit, that is, for not preventing this realization, now fundamental to all knowledge, from arriving.

I think that it's in respect to the highlighted line that you misunderstood me, or maybe I wasn't clear enough myself. The theologians refuted not Aristotle's physical theories, but those metaphysical presuppositions underlying them which were at variance with the Christian theology. This, in turn, prompted some to doubt his physical description of the world as well, thus engendering a quest for truth which finally blosomed fully in the scientific revolution.

     

What was wrong with Aristotle from a scientific standpoint is in addition a matter of what is true about the physical propositions. We don't say, for instance, that the divinity of nature counts against him, nor does it count against his Church opponents that they maintained the opposite. The core of the scientific worldview you wish to credit in part to the Church thinkers is how this is irrelevant to the issue of whether Aristotle is right. We understand that theological refutation has disappeared completely* and this took time to develop. It seems curious that you wish to take credit for the Church for this even though, as I say, they did contribute to it's development.

You really misunderstood me: I don't imply that the Church (or rather, the Churches, since the pioneers and the heroes of the scientific revolution were mostly devout Roman Catholics, Lutherans or Puritans) must be given credit for removing theology from scientific endeavours, since this claim is utterly absurd. All I'm saying is that the Judeo-Christian worldview must be given credit for engendering a mindset which brought about, in the long run, the scientific revolution.
     

[Florestan]

     Incidentally I wouldn't call myself a radical at all. By today's standards I'm a little old fashioned with all the talk about truth and the real world, as well as my faith in materialism. Today a really advanced thinker rejects all that as no more believable than religion. It's all a big light show put on by the powers that be to keep us in ignorance, I guess.

In a previous post I made a distinction between modernism and postmodernism in this respect. I share with you a faith / belief (if you want to term it some other way, please feel free to do it) in the independent existence of the natural world , in its rationality, in the fact that we can, both rationally and empirically, discover its laws and principles and thus attain some degree of truth about how it functions --- and I believe all that precisely because I am a Christian. Where I part with you is in the fact that I don't see this as the only way to arrive at truth.

Now, the position I just described is threatened by the increasingly anti-rational and anti-scientific postmodern worldview, which in its most radical aspects is a return to exactly those pagan views that prevented science from developing.

     

Another way of saying this is that there are no rules for a universe to obey.

I'm afraid I don't understand this claim. Could you please elaborate?

[DavidRoss]

...it's been an interesting discussion, even if we have reached an impasse. I appreciate your replies.

And I appreciate your civil and open-minded questions and responses.  Would that all were so consistently gracious in sharing different points of view!

[Florestan]

regarding the existence or non-existence of something completely undetectable by our senses, the logical default position is that of non-belief.

Not necessarily. Let's consider the electromagnetic waves, which literally wrap us: they are "completely undetectable by our senses". If you would try to explain their existence to a member of an African jungle tribe and his answer would be exactly your line above, what would you do next?

[aquablob]

Not necessarily. Let's consider the electromagnetic waves, which literally wrap us: they are "completely undetectable by our senses". If you would try to explain their existence to a member of an African jungle tribe and his answer would be exactly your line above, what would you do next?

Firstly (to be unnecessarily nit-picky), we can, of course, detect electromagnetic waves (in the form of light) with our eyes.

But I know that's not what you mean.

To answer your question, I will quote what I wrote earlier:

To sway a logical person to believe in the existence of such a thing requires either direct empirical evidence or indirect evidence that forces one, through deduction, to conclude that the thing's existence is likely. The deduction method will probably result in a belief more on the "faith" side of the spectrum than the "knowledge" side, whereas the direct empirical evidence brings us closer to the "knowledge" end of the spectrum.

It would be illogical for the "member of an African jungle tribe" to assume the existence of EM waves on no evidential basis. Obviously, that doesn't mean EM waves don't exist!

What attracts me to science as a philosophy is its willingness—nay, eagerness—to change or altogether abandon present positions/models/theories should contradictory evidence come to light. "Truth" always framed in the context of "so far as we know, based on the evidence": that, to me, is the most reasonable position to take. And as I've stated before, I think an essential element of that philosophy is being selective and objective in how we define "evidence."

[Homo Aestheticus]

Don't forget that art, as precious as it is for our well being, is essentially a luxury. I doubt Wagner would be one your priorities if your children were starving to death.

If that's the case then why are you so concerned with quantifying (musical) genius and with rankings ?  I'm just asking...



I guess Plato was mostly right:

Here is an encore:

"Plato believed that for an intelligent person the ultimate aim of life should be to pierce the surface of things and penetrate to the level of underlying reality. To achieve this a person would have to see through the decaying ephemera that constitute the world of our senses, to free himself from their attractions and seductions. He views the arts as being of their nature representational and as making a powerful appeal to the senses. Music makes an enormous appeal to our senses, and of course the more beautiful it is the more powerful the appeal. Works of art are, in his view, doubly deceptive because they are illusory semblances of things that are illusory semblances... They glamorize the fleeting things of this world, and they enrich our emotional attachment to them, thereby holding us back from our true calling, which is to soar above their level altogether to the timeless and non-sensory reality beyond. So they are a major distraction to our souls..."



 

[Florestan]

Firstly (to be unnecessarily nit-picky), we can, of course, detect electromagnetic waves (in the form of light) with our eyes.

Fair enough.

What attracts me to science as a philosophy is its willingness—nay, eagerness—to change or altogether abandon present positions/models/theories should contradictory evidence come to light. "Truth" always framed in the context of "so far as we know, based on the evidence": that, to me, is the most reasonable position to take. And as I've stated before, I think an essential element of that philosophy is being selective and objective in how we define "evidence."

I have no objection to the above.

I see the situation as follows: the existence or non-existence of God cannot be proved directly in a scientific way and here belief (or lack thereof, which is also a form of belief, see below) comes into play. And once you have adopted a position, you will necessarily interpret the available data as supporting it. For the agnostic, the absence of (scientific) evidence means the evidence of absence; for the theist, the absence of (scientific) evidence means not the evidence of absence*. Since neither party can prove with mathematical certainty that Giod exists or doesn't exist, both positions are ultimately a matter of belief, meaning that: based on unconclusive (scientific) evidence, some choose to believe He does, some choose to believe He doesn't.

*_{I'm paraphrasing Martin Rees here}

[Florestan]

I guess Plato was mostly right:

Here is an encore:

"Plato believed that for an intelligent person the ultimate aim of life should be to pierce the surface of things and penetrate to the level of underlying reality. To achieve this a person would have to see through the decaying ephemera that constitute the world of our senses, to free himself from their attractions and seductions. He views the arts as being of their nature representational and as making a powerful appeal to the senses. Music makes an enormous appeal to our senses, and of course the more beautiful it is the more powerful the appeal. Works of art are, in his view, doubly deceptive because they are illusory semblances of things that are illusory semblances... They glamorize the fleeting things of this world, and they enrich our emotional attachment to them, thereby holding us back from our true calling, which is to soar above their level altogether to the timeless and non-sensory reality beyond. So they are a major distraction to our souls..."

If Plato was right, then why do you so stubbornly cling to a deceptive illusion that distract your soul and hold you back from your true calling? Why don't you break free from the seductive trap of Pelleas and Melisande, or indeed from whole Debussy, nay, from music altogether?

[aquablob]

I see the situation as follows: the existence or non-existence of God cannot be proved directly in a scientific way and here belief (or lack thereof, which is also a form of belief, see below) comes into play. And once you have adopted a position, you will necessarily interpret the available data as supporting it. For the agnostic, the absence of (scientific) evidence means the evidence of absence; for the theist, the absence of (scientific) evidence means not the evidence of absence*. Since neither party can prove with mathematical certainty that Giod exists or doesn't exist, both positions are ultimately a matter of belief, meaning that: based on unconclusive (scientific) evidence, some choose to believe He does, some choose to believe He doesn't.

*_{I'm paraphrasing Martin Rees here}

Good post. I can't disagree with anything you've said. I think (and please let me know if I am guilty of putting words into your mouth) where we differ, though, is that I don't find all such positions equally logical. Let me put it (rather crudely, admittedly) this way: there's no evidence for or against the existence of an invisible and completely undetectable banana floating in space just past the Andromeda Galaxy. Neither a believer or non-believer in said banana (I know, it's silly — sorry, I just couldn't think of anything else) can prove his/her position with certainty. There is no scientific/conclusive evidence one way or the other, but does that make both positions equally logical?

I agree with you, though, that not believing in the banana's existence is, indeed, a form of belief. But not all beliefs are logical equals. In fact, as I've said before, since we can never know anything with 100% certainty, all "knowledge" is, in fact, belief to some extent.

[Josquin des Prez]

If that's the case then why are you so concerned with quantifying (musical) genius and with rankings ?  I'm just asking...



I guess Plato was mostly right:

Here is an encore:

"Plato believed that for an intelligent person the ultimate aim of life should be to pierce the surface of things and penetrate to the level of underlying reality. To achieve this a person would have to see through the decaying ephemera that constitute the world of our senses, to free himself from their attractions and seductions. He views the arts as being of their nature representational and as making a powerful appeal to the senses. Music makes an enormous appeal to our senses, and of course the more beautiful it is the more powerful the appeal. Works of art are, in his view, doubly deceptive because they are illusory semblances of things that are illusory semblances... They glamorize the fleeting things of this world, and they enrich our emotional attachment to them, thereby holding us back from our true calling, which is to soar above their level altogether to the timeless and non-sensory reality beyond. So they are a major distraction to our souls..."

There's always the possibility that art, in Plato's time, did not achieve the same level of transcendence as it did in Europe.

[Josquin des Prez]

Good post. I can't disagree with anything you've said. I think (and please let me know if I am guilty of putting words into your mouth) where we differ, though, is that I don't find all such positions equally logical. Let me put it (rather crudely, admittedly) this way: there's no evidence for or against the existence of an invisible and completely undetectable banana floating in space just past the Andromeda Galaxy. Neither a believer or non-believer in said banana (I know, it's silly — sorry, I just couldn't think of anything else) can prove his/her position with certainty. There is no scientific/conclusive evidence one way or the other, but does that make both positions equally logical?

Yes, but the Banana doesn't explain life, the universe and everything. God does.