The Greatest Thinker Of The Millennium

[Florestan]

     Since little in philosophy is verifiable, it can't be judged by the standards that prevail in science. The best of philosophy is that which supports and accommodates natural philosophy, that is, science. That means that the rule-based activity the philosopher engages in should have as it's principle goal explaining why it's sound practice to verify claims the way that scientists do. No wonder many scientists find nothing in philosophy. What is there to find is what they are doing already.

This is strongly reminiscent of the medieval dictum that philosophy should be the handmaid of theology. Substituting science for theology doesn't make it less dogmatic.



     

[Homo Aestheticus]

The empiricists I almost view as scientists.

By the way, I was pleasantly surprised to read the following :

"There is no reason for studying philosophy, except that, to certain temperaments, this is an agreeable way of passing the time..."

--David Hume

[Florestan]

By the way, I was pleasantly surprised to read the following :

"There is no reason for studying philosophy, except that, to certain temperaments, this is an agreeable way of passing the time..."

--David Hume

"Pleasantly surprised" why? Because it confirms your own anti-intellectualist prejudices? If one puts the problem that way, there is no reason for studying anything. What is Pelleas and Melisande to you other than a pleasant pastime?

[Homo Aestheticus]

Andrei,

"Pleasantly surprised" why? Because it confirms your own anti-intellectualist prejudices?

Not at all. Isn't Hume referring to metaphysics ?

If one puts the problem that way, there is no reason for studying anything. What is Pelleas and Melisande to you other than a pleasant pastime?

Excuse me ? What does philosophical thinking have to do with music or aesthetic pleasure ?

[Haffner]

Excuse me ? What does philosophical thinking have to do with music or aesthetic pleasure ?

Being that you are very much into Pelleas et Melisande as well as Wagner, I'm guessing that you meant this ironically.

[aquablob]

This is too much

[Cato]

Philosophy becomes a whore if connected only to science.  

Philosophy's primary goal should be to pose the ultimate question: Why?

If the philosophers want to haggle about the meaning of haggis or circumcontemplate the possibility of paratactic logic, fine, but those should be merely entertaining divertimentos.

[drogulus]

This is strongly reminiscent of the medieval dictum that philosophy should be the handmaid of theology. Substituting science for theology doesn't make it less dogmatic.



     

     It's not a dogmatic statement. Philosophers don't just think, they also observe. And when they do, they decide on that basis whether theology or science provide a model that produce knowledge about the world. The decision, which was formerly arrived at dogmatically, no longer is, creating "dogma envy" in the jilted theologians. There are also philosophers whose hostility to science looks envious, too. Often this comes up in the form of siding with creationists against science as part of their opposition to a dominant paradigm, accompanied by dark musings about how science is just another manipulation by the rulers to keep us down.

     I'm not suggesting that philosophy finds its purpose only in cheerleading for science, but rather that it is a principle function of a discipline devoted to knowledge to show what distinguishes the scientific enterprise from other ways of thinking about things. Something needs to be explained, which is a job for explainers.

     

Philosophy becomes a whore if connected only to science.  

Philosophy's primary goal should be to pose the ultimate question: Why?

     No. Philosophy will never be limited merely to the justification of science. Natural philosophy is a big part of philosophy, though, and the discipline will continue to be interested in the development of all the former parts of itself that are seen to do useful work.

     Why usually implies agency or intention, though not conscious in all cases. Anyone who can ask why and say something interesting is free to do so, even philosophers. They have no special responsibility to answer the question if there isn't anything that can provide it. Sometimes the what and how is all the why you'll be able to get. Without a Spaghetti Monster to help, that is. Maybe a philosopher can explain why there isn't one of those? 

[Florestan]

     Philosophers don't just think, they also observe. And when they do, they decide on that basis whether theology or science provide a model that produce knowledge about the world.

If this is not dogmatic, then words have lost all meaning. How do you call then prescribing what philosophy should do and assessing a philosopher's merit (or lack thereof) accordingly?

The decision, which was formerly arrived at dogmatically, no longer is, creating "dogma envy" in the jilted theologians. There are also philosophers whose hostility to science looks envious, too. Often this comes up in the form of siding with creationists against science as part of their opposition to a dominant paradigm, accompanied by dark musings about how science is just another manipulation by the rulers to keep us down.

Presenting philosophy as a sort of intellectual Robin Hood taking from the undeservingly rich and giving to the meritous poor and philosophers as referees in an imaginary catch-as-catch-can between science and theology is a caricature.

Be it as it may, could you please give us an example of a philosopher who, because of his envious hostility to science, took side with creationists and mused about the evil manipulation of science by the powers-that-be?
   
     
   
     

[drogulus]

    When someone challenges your dogma, if you are a dogmatist, you will probably say it must be another dogma. This is like saying the unbeliever is just another kind of believer with a different religion. This gets things very wrong. Nonbelievers are not followers of a different dogma. They have decided that some knowledge, like say the origin of the Universe, can't be arrived at by dogmatic means. Are we to believe that that is a dogmatic position? Only if words have no meaning. 

    What philosophy is really doing here is taking from the undeserving poor and giving to the deserving rich.

   

[Haffner]

   

    What philosophy is really doing here is taking from the undeserving poor and giving to the deserving rich.

   

Very cool, the way you put that, Ernie.

[Florestan]

I reiterate my previous questions since you haven't answer them.

1. How do you call someone prescribing a priori what philosophy should do and assessing a philosopher's merit (or lack thereof) according to his conforming or not to the prescription?

2. Could you please give us an example of a philosopher who, because of his envious hostility to science, took side with creationists and mused about the evil manipulation of science by the powers-that-be?
   
 

[Josquin des Prez]

Excuse me ? What does philosophical thinking have to do with music or aesthetic pleasure ?

Because philosophical thinking involves the same type of creative process that in the hands of the artist leads to the great works of arts. This is why we refer to the philosopher as a genius, but not the scientist. Reading Plato's Republic, or Kant's Critique of pure reason is akin to reading Homer, or Goethe, or any of the great poets of the past.

[bwv 1080]

     Since little in philosophy is verifiable, it can't be judged by the standards that prevail in science. The best of philosophy is that which supports and accommodates natural philosophy, that is, science. That means that the rule-based activity the philosopher engages in should have as it's principle goal explaining why it's sound practice to verify claims the way that scientists do. No wonder many scientists find nothing in philosophy. What is there to find is what they are doing already.

     The philosopher makes rules instead of discoveries. Discoveries are verified, and rules are used. What the empiricists and pragmatists are saying is that the verifications the scientists use are their own justification. Many other philosophical trends take the view that some other higher form of guarantee must underwrite these claims or they lack legitimacy. A god or Absolute Form must make things true or everything will fall into chaos or won't exist. Radical pragmatists like Rorty (though they don't see this) are covert absolutists whose relativism about truth is just a variant of "There's a god so I won't eat my baby". Naturally they look askance at any view, like that common among scientists, that things run on their own without authorities butting in.

     

But you are making a category mistake in treating philosophy by the standards of science.  Just because a particular answer to a question cannot be verified does not make the question any less important than an empirically verifiable question asked by science.  "What sort of rights should society guarantee to its individual members" is a question without answers that can be proven or disproven, nevertheless it is arguably a more important question than anything asked by the natural sciences.

[Florestan]

But you are making a category mistake in treating philosophy by the standards of science.  Just because a particular answer to a question cannot be verified does not make the question any less important than an empirically verifiable question asked by science.  "What sort of rights should society guarantee to its individual members" is a question without answers that can be proven or disproven, nevertheless it is arguably a more important question than anything asked by the natural sciences.

Agreed.

[Josquin des Prez]

But you are making a category mistake in treating philosophy by the standards of science.  Just because a particular answer to a question cannot be verified does not make the question any less important than an empirically verifiable question asked by science.  "What sort of rights should society guarantee to its individual members" is a question without answers that can be proven or disproven, nevertheless it is arguably a more important question than anything asked by the natural sciences.

Good point.

[drogulus]

     On The Idea of Continental and Postmodern Perspectives in the Philosophy of Science

     The alliance between postmodern philosophy and creation/religion is, or ought to be, a cringe-making one for both sides, something like the Iranian support for Sunni extremists. They have a common enemy, science and the analytic philosophical tradition that supports it. The postmodernist is hardly likely to grant the truth of what the believers say. The believer functions here like the victim in identity politics generally, as a stick to beat the scientist/capitalist with. So, though nothing the believers say is true for the postmodernist (how could it be?), they are "oppressed" and therefore worthy. What I've read on the Dover case is probably typical. Scientific discourse is just another way of knowing (since nothing is really known I don't really get the point of all these ways of it).

     Anyway, try to read the paper if you want to get the gist of the "envy" position. I have to warn you, though, it's truly awful. But you probably have more tolerance for hermeneutics than I do.

     

I reiterate my previous questions since you haven't answer them.

1. How do you call someone prescribing a priori what philosophy should do and assessing a philosopher's merit (or lack thereof) according to his conforming or not to the prescription?

2. Could you please give us an example of a philosopher who, because of his envious hostility to science, took side with creationists and mused about the evil manipulation of science by the powers-that-be?
   
 

    Someone has to decide what being a lover of knowledge amounts to. Among the someones is (heh!)me. So I have decided that those philosophers who understand what distinguishes successful enterprises from wheel-spinning ones get the prize. I don't see what's a priori about it. You watch what they do and pay attention to what they say. If you don't have a dogma to instruct you that's all you can do. Don't you do that?

    Anti-scientific philosophy is a big subject. I linked to an article that is helpful in a negative sort of way.

But you are making a category mistake in treating philosophy by the standards of science.  Just because a particular answer to a question cannot be verified does not make the question any less important than an empirically verifiable question asked by science.  "What sort of rights should society guarantee to its individual members" is a question without answers that can be proven or disproven, nevertheless it is arguably a more important question than anything asked by the natural sciences.

     The whole point of my post, which was a response to nut-job, is exactly that. I defended non-verifiable philosophy as necessary and gave an explanation. Maybe you don't agree with my idea about it. I sum it up as sciences verifies facts about the world, and philosophers propound rules about 1) what is found and what to think about it 2) what we want in light of what we know. None of this is directly verifiable, but it is so valuable that we can't cease doing it. Facts are verified, rules are used.

     This may sound like a pinched version of philosophy, but it's far more expansive than some I've seen.

[drogulus]

     Since little in philosophy is verifiable, it can't be judged by the standards that prevail in science.

But you are making a category mistake in treating philosophy by the standards of science.  

     

[drogulus]

I reiterate my previous questions since you haven't answer them.

1. How do you call someone prescribing a priori what philosophy should do and assessing a philosopher's merit (or lack thereof) according to his conforming or not to the prescription?

2. Could you please give us an example of a philosopher who, because of his envious hostility to science, took side with creationists and mused about the evil manipulation of science by the powers-that-be?
   
 

     Steve Fuller testified for the Discovery Institute at the Dover trial. His views are shared, I don't know exactly how widely, among the Social Constructionists. It's part of the sociology of science movement I mentioned briefly earlier but didn't elaborate on. I tend to avoid these guys because I used to read their stuff trying to figure out what the point of it is.

    I can recommend the book Fashionable Nonsense: Postmodern Intellectuals' Abuse of Science by Alan Sokal and Jean Bricmont if you're interested in the subject. After you read the book I doubt you'll want the "friendship" of the theorists that the book exposes as the charlatans and (dare I say it?) morons they are. This book does not go into the alliance of religion and PoMo. I don't have a reference for that right now.

[Haffner]

I'm a person whom judges the ultimate value of a philosophy according to how much he "gets" out of it, in other words "how much my life is improved by that philosophy", or at least "how much my life improved when I apply this or that (or myriad) philosophie(s) to a certain period in my life". And, I wonder if the basic Weltanschauung of a person, during a specific period in his or her life, determines a certain philosophy's worth.

When I look back on my own studies, I see how much and how often Continental and Post-Modern philosophy had a positive impact on my life. So I wonder if that tells me that I'm a hopeless Romantic.