68 years ago today, the largest war in history began

[Florestan]

Yes, but that is rarely a good enough reason in and of itself. E.g. East Germany was the German Democratic Republic, but we would hardly accuse them of being 'democrats' (lower case 'd' for the avoidance of doubt among US readers). 

True, but in the case of "democratic" we had other ruling parties who called themselves as such and acted quite differently. In the case of "communism" the behaviour was strikingly uniform for all ruling parties who identified as such. 

[MishaK]

In the case of "communism" the behaviour was strikingly uniform for all ruling parties who identified as such. 

Not entirely. The Italian 'Communists' were actually quite effective and competent in regional and municipal governments in Italy and exhibited none of the behavior otherwise 'uniform' to those in Eastern Europe or East Asia. (There may be other examples that I am unfamiliar with, but this one  just off the top of my head.)

[Archaic Torso of Apollo]

Can't really agree with that, unless you have very loose definitions of 'normal', 'occasional' and 'totalitarian'. With the institution of Gleichschaltung in Germany in 1933/34, totalitarian Nazism became a cradle-to-grave way of life.

I may have been misrepresenting the book somewhat, since it's been a few years since I read it. Most likely his observations applied more to the USSR than to Germany.

[Florestan]

Not entirely. The Italian 'Communists' were actually quite effective and competent in regional and municipal governments in Italy and exhibited none of the behavior otherwise 'uniform' to those in Eastern Europe or East Asia.

True, but they had only regional and municipal power and as such they were checked and balanced by other authorities and parties; they never had full and exclusive control of both the central and the local governments, as the Communist Party of Romania had, for instance. In France there were also a number of municipalities that had Communist mayors and councils, but similarly to Italy, they shared the power with other parties. In both cases, the communists were turned into left-wing social-democrats by force of reality: free elections never gave communist majorities at country level.

In those unfortunate countries where there were no checks and balances whatsoever to their power they unleashed hell.

[MishaK]

True, but they had only regional and municipal power and as such they were checked and balanced by other authorities and parties; they never had full and exclusive control of both the central and the local governments, as the Communist Party of Romania had, for instance. In France there were also a number of municipalities that had Communist mayors and councils, but similarly to Italy, they shared the power with other parties. In both cases, the communists were turned into left-wing social-democrats by force of reality: free elections never gave communist majorities at country level.

In those unfortunate countries where there were no checks and balances whatsoever to their power they unleashed hell.

Sure, but in those unfortunate countries they were beholden to the diktat from Moscow. My only point is that behavior isn't quite as uniform as you say, especially once you look outside of the Warsaw Pact.

But your implicit point is a good one: democratic competition over time has a de-radicalizing effect. 'Communists' become social democrats just through necessity of pragmatic political compromise. Another example would be the Greens in Germany which turned from radical student fringe in the 60s to probably the most responsibly run and inclusive political party today. That effect is precisely why a well-balanced representative democracy still is the best system.

[Sarastro]

Absolutely untrue, sorry.

What is "absolutely untrue"? That people tend to forget things over time? Well, in my case it is very true. Do you often talk to younger generations? Maybe it's different in Romania, and children there are brought in full awareness of the atrocities and crimes of the Nazi Germany and Soviet Russia, but here, the former and the latter are somewhat remote irrelevant countries. Besides, all of the crimes of the Soviet Union have been publicized by the Russian Federation government in 1991, and now are in free access in the Internet. Everyone who has interest in it, can find out.
In Russia, though we heard stories from our grandparents about how life was going during the War (in fact, my great grandmother was almost killed by a fascist, but escaped by providence), this conflict seemed so ancient... and although Russia was opposing Germany in the War, people barely say anything about the crimes of the Nazis. Are they downplayed? I think everyone knows, but is polite enough not to touch sore topics. And in fact I don't care too much as well -- it had happened in the past, and it can not be changed. I am more concerned with what's going on in the world now and how do avoid new conflicts.

Coincidentally, just yesterday I had two occasions with socialism being mentioned. First, when my philosophy teacher was talking about the meaning of the words, he said that many people misuse the word "socialism" and that he would go with the definition proposed by Marx. Maybe, it makes the most sense. And secondly, I talked to a person who actually lived under the system itself, and he also said, that it was in no sense socialism.

[Maciek]

Besides, all of the crimes of the Soviet Union have been publicized by the Russian Federation government in 1991, and now are in free access in the Internet. Everyone who has interest in it, can find out.

Personally, I don't think that settles matters in any meaningful sense. As far as I know, the perpetrators of these crimes have never been tried or sentenced (let alone punished, which I'd think is actually less important). I don't think they've even been publicly condemned. And that would be an important prerequisite of rehabilitating the victims. Also, contrary to what you're saying, there are lots of details which still haven't been disclosed. One would think that it is in modern-day Russia's best interest to reveal everything, condemn it, and thus safely seal it off (a "lets leave the past behind us" attitude would be justified then). By doing the opposite, Russian authorities are making themselves ideological heirs to murderers from the past (after all, they are apparently trying to maintain a 70-year old cover up). It's an odd situation, where - unofficially - they're not denying it. They're even admitting it happened. But officially: practically nothing has changed.

Katyn is a case in point. Not only is Mukhin constantly publishing his inanities (which is OK, I guess, as long as no one calls him a "historian"), but the Katyn massacre has never been officially classified as a war crime or a genocide (and that in turn prevents a proper trial from being held). Here's a quote from a 2008 news item, which gives an overview of the situation:

The Polish Institute of National Remembrance has long sought to convince the Russian government to apply its 1991 law "On the rehabilitation of victims of political repression" to the Katyn victims, but suits have so far been unsuccessful. Russia's own 10-year investigation of the massacre ended in 2005 when the government closed its classified files and said the crime's statute of limitations had expired. In July, the Moscow City Court blocked an attempt by family members of the victims to renew investigations into the killings. In 2006, the families filed a complaint with the Court of Human Rights, asking it to classify the incident as genocide and compel the Russian government to disclose its information. In October the Court of Human rights agreed to hear a plea from family members asking that the victims of the Katyn massacre be classified as war crimes victims.

So, when you say that a lot of time has passed and it's time to move one, well, I would agree with you if the matter had been settled. If that was the case, then, indeed, why keep droning on about it? The problem is that practically none of these issues have been settled and heaps of information still haven't been made available by the Russian authorities. (There's a similar case with the British, who 66 years after the death of general Sikorski are still refusing to declassify the files which could shed some light on his death - and here, too, the propable reason is their complicity. This is actually closely linked to Katyn, since the British were probably taking part in the Soviet cover up - at least to the extent that they did not want Sikorski to stir things up.)

[Archaic Torso of Apollo]

Personally, I don't think that settles matters in any meaningful sense. As far as I know, the perpetrators of these crimes have never been tried or sentenced (let alone punished, which I'd think is actually less important).

The obvious problem with this is that the vast majority of serious Communist/Bolshevik crimes took place in the period 1918-1953, but it was impossible to deal with them until after 1989. By then, due to either old age or Stalin's charming habit of eliminating the people who did his dirty work, very few of the movers or shakers were around.

Regarding "details not disclosed," I don't know the specifics of this, but it seems to me the vast majority of pertinent information is available. I can walk into any decent bookstore in Moscow and buy a copy of The Gulag Archipelago (and probably any other classic of anti-Communist lit you could name).

[bwv 1080]

Historian David Glantz, perhaps the foremost authority on the Russo-German writing about myths and realities of WW2:

http://www.strom.clemson.edu/publications/sg-war41-45.pdf

German Losses:

September 1939-
1 September 1942 922,000 (Over 90 % in the East)
1 September 1942-
20 November 1943 2,077,000 (Over 90 % in the East)
20 November 1943-
June 1944 1,500,000 est. (80 % in the East)
June-November 1944 1,457,000 (903,000 or 62 % in the East)
30 December 1944-
30 April 1945 2,000,000 (67 % in the East)
=====
Total Losses to
30 April 1945 11,135,500
3,888,000 dead
3,035,700 captured
=====
Total Armed Forces Losses 13,488,000
10,758,000 (80 % in the East
From September 1939 to September 1942, the bulk of the German Army's
922,000 dead, missing, and disabled (14% of Germany's total armed force) could be
credited to combat in the East. Between 1 September 1942 and 20 November 1943, this
grim toll rose to 2,077,000 (30% of Germany's total armed force), again primarily in the
East. After the opening of the "second front" in Normandy, the Wehrmacht suffered
another 1,457,000 irrevocable losses (dead, missing, or captured) from June through
November 1944. Of this number, it suffered 903,000 (62% of the total losses) of these
losses in the East. Finally, after losing 120,000 men to the Allies in the Battle of the
Bulge, from 1 January to 30 April 1945, the Wehrmacht suffered another 2 million losses,
two-thirds of which fell victim to the Red Army. Today, the stark inscriptions "Died in
the East," which are carved on countless thousands of headstones in scores of German
cemeteries bear mute witness to the carnage in the East, where the will and strength of the
Wehrmacht perished.
In addition, Germany's allies also suffered mightily, losing almost 2 million men in
less than four years of war

On the relative contributions of the USSR and Western Allies

On the 50th anniversary of the Normandy invasion of 1944, a U.S. news magazine
featured a cover photo of General Dwight D. Eisenhower, who was labeled as the man
who defeated Hitler. If any one man deserved that label, it was not Eisenhower but
Zhukov, Vasilevsky, or possibly Stalin himself. More generally, the Red Army and the
Soviet citizenry of many nationalities bore the lion's share of the struggle against
Germany from 1941 to 1945. Only China, which suffered almost continuous Japanese
attack from 1931 onward, matched the level of Soviet suffering and effort. In military
terms, moreover, the Chinese participation in the war was almost insignificant in
comparison with the Soviet war, which constantly engaged absorbed more than half of all
German forces.
From June through December 1941, only Britain shared with the Soviet Union the
trials of war against the Germans. Over 3 million German troops fought in the East, while
900,000 struggled elsewhere, attended to occupied Europe, or rested in the homeland.
From December 1941 through November 1942, while over nine million troops on both
sides struggled in the East, the only significant ground action in the Western Theater took
place in North Africa, where relatively small British forces engaged Rommel's Afrika
Corps and its Italian allies.
In October and November 1942, the British celebrated victory over the Germans
at El Alamein, defeating four German divisions and a somewhat larger Italian force, and
inflicting 60,000 axis losses. The same month, at Stalingrad, the Soviets defeated and
encircled German Sixth Army, damaged Fourth Panzer Army, and smashed Rumanian
Third and Fourth Armies, eradicating over 50 divisions and over 300,000 men from the
Axis order of battle. By May 1943 the Allies pursued Rommel's Afrika Corps across
northern Africa and into Tunisia, where after heavy fighting, the German and Italian force
of 250,000 surrendered. Meanwhile, in the East, another German army (the Second) was
severely mauled, and Italian Eighth and Hungarian Second Armies were utterly destroyed,
exceeding Axis losses in Tunisia.
While over 3.5 million German and Soviet troops struggled at Kursk and 8.5
million later fought on a 1,500-mile front from the Leningrad region to the Black Sea coast,
in July 1943 Allied forces invaded Sicily, and drove 60,000 Germans from the island. In
August the Allies landed on the Italian peninsula. By October, when 2.5 million men of
the Wehrmacht faced 6.6 million Soviets, the frontlines had stabilized in Italy south of
Rome as the Germans deployed a much smaller, although significant, number of troops to
halt the Allied advance.
By 1 October 1943, 2,565,000 men (63%) of the Wehrmacht's 4,090,000-man
force struggled in the East, together with the bulk of the 300,000 Waffen SS troops. On 1
June 1944, 239 (62%) of the German Army's 386 division equivalents fought in the East.
With operations in Italy at a stalemate, until June 1944, in fact, the Wehrmacht still
considered the west as a semi-reserve. In August 1944, after the opening of the second
front, while 2.1 million Germans fought in the East, 1 million opposed Allied operations
in France.
Casualty figures underscore this reality. From September 1939 to September
1942, the bulk of the German Army's 922,000 dead, missing, and disabled (14% of the
total force) could be credited to combat in the East. Between 1 September 1942 and 20
November 1943 this grim count rose to 2,077,000 (30% of the total force), again
primarily in the East. From June through November 1944, after the opening of the second
front, the German Army suffered another 1,457,000 irrevocable losses. Of this number,
903,000 (62%) were lost in the East. Finally, after losing 120,000 men to the Allies in the
Battle of the Bulge, from 1 January to 30 April 1945 the Germans suffered another 2
million losses, two-thirds at Soviet hands. Today, the stark inscription, "died in the
East," that is carved on countless thousands of headstones in scores of German cemeteries
bear mute witness to the carnage in the East, where the will and strength of the
Wehrmacht perished.
The Role of the "Second Front" in Allied Victory:
During the war and since war's end, the Soviets have bitterly complained since the
war about the absence of a real "second front" before June 1944, and that issue remains a
source of suspicion even in post Cold War Russia. Yet, Allied reasons for deferring a
second front until 1944 were valid, and Allied contributions to victories were significant.
As the American debacle at the Kasserine Pass in December 1942 and Canadian
performance at Dieppe in 1943 indicated, Allied armies were not ready to operate in
France in 1943, even had a sufficient number of landing craft been available for the
invasion, which they were not. Even in 1944 Allied success at Normandy was a close
thing and depended, in part, on major German misperceptions and mistakes. Once in
France, after the breakout from the Normandy bridgehead in August, the 2 million Allied
troops in France inflicted grievous losses on the 1 million defending Germans, 100,000 at
Falaise, and a total of 400,000 by December 1944. In the subsequent battle of the Bulge
(16 December 1944-31 January 1945), the Germans lost another 120,000 men. These
losses in the West, combined with the over 1.2 million lost in the East during the same
period, broke the back of the Wehrmacht and set the context for the final destruction of
Germany in 1945.
In addition to its ground combat contribution, the Allies conducted a major
strategic bombing campaign against Germany (which the Soviets could not mount) and in
1944 drew against themselves the bulk of German operational and tactical airpower. The
strategic bombing campaign did significant damage to German industrial targets, struck
hard at the well-being and morale of the German civil population, and sucked into its
vortex and destroyed a large part of the German fighter force, which had earlier been used
effectively in a ground role in the East. Although airpower did not prove to be a warwinning
weapon, and German industrial mobilization and weapons production peaked in
late 1944, the air campaign seriously hindered the German war effort.
Equally disastrous for the Germans were the losses of tactical fighters in that
campaign and in combat in France in 1944. So devastating were these losses that after
mid-1944 the German air force was no longer a factor on the Eastern Front.
The Role of Lend-Lease in Allied Victory:
Another controversial Allied contribution to the war effort was the Lend-Lease
program of aid to the Soviet Union. Although Soviet accounts have routinely belittled the
significance of Lend-Lease in sustaining the Soviet war effort, the overall importance of
this assistance cannot be understated. Lend-Lease aid did not arrive in sufficient
quantities to make the difference between defeat and victory in 1941-42; that achievement
must be attributed solely to the Soviet people and to the iron nerve of Stalin, Zhukov,
Shaposhnikov, Vasilevsky, and their subordinates. As the war continued, however, the
United States and Great Britain provided many of the implements of war and strategic
raw materials necessary for Soviet victory (Se Figure 7).
Without Lend-Lease food, clothing, and raw materials (especially metals), the
Soviet economy would have been even more heavily burdened by the war effort. Perhaps
most directly, without Lend-Lease trucks, rail engines, and railroad cars, every Soviet
offensive would have stalled at an earlier stage, outrunning its logistical tail in a matter of
days. In turn, this would have allowed the German commanders to escape at least some
encirclements, while forcing the Red Army to prepare and conduct many more deliberate
penetration attacks in order to advance the same distance. Left to their own devices,
Stalin and his commanders might have taken 12 to 18 months longer to finish off the
Wehrmacht; the ultimate result would probably have been the same, except that Soviet
soldiers could have waded at France's Atlantic beaches. Thus, while the Red Army shed
the bulk of Allied blood, it would have shed more blood for longer without Allied
assistance.

What-ifs and other controversies:

The Myth of Stalin's Preventative War:
On 15 May 1941, General G, K. Zhukov, then Chief of the Red Army General
Staff, sent Stalin a proposal for a preventative offensive against German forces
concentrating in Eastern Poland. Although Defense Commissar S. K. Timoshenko
initialed the proposal, there is no evidence either that Stalin saw it or acted upon it. The
proposal and other fragmentary evidence provides the basis for recent claims that Stalin
indeed intended to conduct a preventative war against Germany beginning in July 1941
and that Hitler's Operation Barbarossa preempted Stalin's intended actions.
Current evidence refutes that assertion. As subsequent events and archival
evidence proves, the Red Army was in no condition to wage war in the summer of 1941
either offensively or, as the actual course of combat indicated, defensively.
q The Timing of Operation Barbarossa:
Hitler commenced Operation Barbarossa on 22 June 1941, after delaying his
invasion of the Soviet Union for roughly two months so that the Wehrmacht could
conquer Yugoslavia and Greece. Some have claimed that this delay proved fatal for
Operation Barbarossa. Had Germany invaded the Soviet Union in April rather than June,
they state, Moscow and Leningrad would have fallen, and Hitler would have achieved his
Barbarossa objectives.
This assertion is incorrect. Hitler's Balkan diversion took place at a time of year
when the spring thaw (the rasputitsa [literally, "time of clogged roads"]) prevented
extensive military operations of any scale, particularly mobile panzer operations, in the
western Soviet Union. Furthermore, the forces Hitler committed in the Balkans was only
a small portion of his overall Barbarossa force, and it returned from the Balkans in good
condition and in time to play its role in Barbarossa.
A corollary to this issue is the thesis that the Wehrmacht would have performed
better if Hitler had postponed Barbarossa until the summer of 1942. This is quite
unlikely, since Stalin's program to reform, reorganize, and reequip the Red Army, which
was woefully incomplete when the Germans struck in 1941, would have been fully
completed by the summer of 1942. Although the Wehrmacht would still have been more
tactically and operationally proficient than the Red Army in 1942, the latter would have
possessed a larger and more formidable mechanized force equipped with armor superior
to that of the Germans. In addition, Hitler would have invaded the Soviet Union with the
full knowledge that he was then engaging in a two-front war with the United States (and
perhaps Britain) and the Soviet Union.
q Guderian's Southward Turn (Kiev)
In September 1941, after Red Army resistance stiffened east of Smolensk, Hitler
temporarily abandoned his direct thrust on Moscow by turning one half of Army Group
Center's panzer forces (Guderian's Second Panzer Group) to the south to envelop and
destroy the Soviet Southwestern Front, which was defending Kiev. By virtue of
Guderian's southward turn, the Wehrmacht destroyed the entire Southwestern Front east
of Kiev during September, inflicting 600,000 losses on the Red Army, while Soviet forces
west of Moscow conducted a futile and costly offensive against German forces around
Smolensk. After this Kiev diversion, Hitler launched Operation Typhoon in October,
only to see his offensive falter at the gates of Moscow in early December. Some claim
that had Hitler launched Operation Typhoon in September rather than October, the
Wehrmacht would have avoided the terrible weather conditions and reached and captured
Moscow before the onset of winter.
This argument too does not hold up to close scrutiny. Had Hitler launched
Operation Typhoon in September, Army Group Center would have had to penetrate
deep Soviet defenses manned by a force that had not squandered its strength in fruitless
offensives against German positions east of Smolensk. Furthermore, Army Group Center
would have launched its offensive with a force of more than 600,000 men threatening its
ever-extending right flank and, in the best reckoning, would have reached the gates of
Moscow after mid-October just as the fall rainy season was beginning.
Finally, the Stavka saved Moscow by raising and fielding 10 reserve armies that
took part in the final defense of the city, the December 1941 counterstrokes, and the
January 1942 counteroffensive. These armies would have gone into action regardless of
when Hitler launched Operation Typhoon. While they effectively halted and drove back
the German offensive short of Moscow as the operation actually developed, they would
also have been available to do so had the Germans attacked Moscow a month earlier.
Furthermore, if the latter were the case, they would have been able to operate in
conjunction with the 600,000 plus force of Army Group Center's overextended right
flank.
q "What if" Moscow had Fallen:
The argument that Hitler would have won the war if the Wehrmacht had been able
to capture Moscow, a corollary to the arguments described above, is also subject to
serious question. If Hitler's legions had actually reached and tried to capture Moscow, it
is likely that Stalin would have assigned one or more of his reserve armies to fight and die
in its defense. Although the Germans might have seized the bulk of the city, they would
likely have found themselves facing the same lamentable dilemma that the Sixth Army
faced at Stalingrad a year later. More ominous still, had it captured Moscow, the
Wehrmacht would have faced the daunting task of trying to winter in Moscow, with the
inherent danger of emulating the fate of Napoleon's army in 1812.