Petraeus' dubious strategy in Afghanistan

[bwv 1080]

Petraeus' dubious strategy in Afghanistan

By Christopher Layne

August 23, 2010

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Gen. David Petraeus recently began a public relations blitz to convince American public opinion that the U.S. should stay the course in Afghanistan rather than holding to President Obama's pledge to start withdrawing troops in July.

But most non-military observers understand that the war in Afghanistan cannot be won in any meaningful sense. They also understand a big reason for this is that success in Afghanistan requires a lot more than battlefield victory. To stabilize Afghanistan, the U.S. needs to establish good governance and foster economic development there. In a word, the U.S. must engage in nation-building. The U.S. has a long record of failure at that. Petraeus, however, would have Americans believe that the war can be turned around if we just give his strategy more time, troops and money. In making this case, Petraeus is banking on his prestige as the architect of the 2007 Iraq surge.

That credibility, however, rests on a dubious foundation. The media-savvy Petraeus created a myth — and that is what it is — that the Iraqi surge was successful. Studies of the Iraq war have shown, however, that the surge was incidental to dampening down the violence in Iraq. Most important, however, the surge failed to achieve its overriding objective, which was, as then-President George W. Bush declared, buying time for Iraq's Shia and Sunni populations to achieve political reconciliation. As the current political stalemate in Baghdad indicates, in this respect the surge failed, and Iraq faces a bleak political future.

The strategy Petraeus advocates for Afghanistan is a dubious one based on the counter-insurgency (COIN) doctrine of which he is the primary author. Col. John Nagl, an influential COIN theorist who is president of the Center for a New American Security, has said it will take "at least a generation" for the U.S. to prevail in the fight against terrorism. The new strategy assumes that the global counter-insurgency may last as long as the Cold War, and will require a greater mobilization of national resources than has occurred to date.

The problem with COIN is that in the real world none of the preconditions that military planners deem necessary for success can be fulfilled. Neither Congress nor the American public is willing to accept an open-ended military commitment to Afghanistan.

COIN misdiagnoses the root cause of America's Middle Eastern difficulties. The U.S. is the target of Islamic terrorists because of its regional policies like support for corrupt regimes, its one-sided stance on the Israeli/Palestinian problem, its heavy politico-military presence, and the fact that the U.S. appears to many in the Middle East to be the imperial successor in the region to the French and British who once dominated it. As Andrew Mack, currently on the faculty of the School of International Studies at Simon Fraser University, pointed out in a classic article 35 years ago, there is a good reason that big states lose small wars: The forces of national and religious identity are stronger than the will of outside powers — powers that, inevitably one day will go home.

On its own terms, COIN is a problematic policy. Even more worryingly, it sets exactly the wrong grand strategic priorities for the United States. In an ironic coincidence, the same morning leading newspapers carried reports of Gen. Petraeus' remarks, another headline announced that China has overtaken Japan as the world's second largest economic power and is on track to overtake the U.S. by 2030 (indeed perhaps as soon as 2020, according to many leading experts). In the early 21st century, East Asia is becoming the world's geopolitical and economic fulcrum, and it is U.S. air and naval power that will be needed to meet the emerging challenge from China. That is where America's long-term grand strategic interests lie —- not in fighting futile Eurasian land wars in places like Afghanistan and Iraq.

Christopher Layne, the Robert M. Gates Chair in Intelligence and National Security at Texas A&M University's Bush School of Government and Public Service, is writing a book on the collapse of the Pax Americana.

Copyright © 2010, Chicago Tribune

[Coopmv]

The Soviet Union could not win there and neither was the British Empire triumphant there.  The US will be no exceptions.

[bwv 1080]

The Soviet Union could not win there and neither was the British Empire triumphant there.  The US will be no exceptions.

yep

[Florestan]

Excellent article, thanks for posting it.

there is a good reason that big states lose small wars: The forces of national and religious identity are stronger than the will of outside powers — powers that, inevitably one day will go home.

This should be carved visibly in the walls of the Oval Office. 

The Soviet Union could not win there and neither was the British Empire triumphant there.  The US will be no exceptions.

Since when are history and its lessons supposed to inform the US foreign policy? 

[Franco]

I suppose what is missing from the analysis in the article and others like it, is the fact that after being attacked and having over 3,000 of its citizens killed by terrorists who are based in Afghanistan, the US had little choice but to go after the perpetrators.

While I am disappointed with how this effort has been carried out (one would think that after nearly ten years Osama could have been found and killed along with his leadership) - the Afghan war had a much sounder rationale than the Iraq invasion, and I think on balance the ability of Al Qaeda to repeat another 9/11 attack has been severely crippled if not entirely eliminated.  This is due to the combined policies put in place after 9/11 of which the military campaign has been a considerable part, but still just one aspect.

As far as Gen. David Petraeus' strategy, I consider him the best person to be in the position of charting the future course for the US in Afghanistan and do not find these think-tank analysts very relevant.

[bwv 1080]

Franco-

I agree some sort of punitive strike was called for

but we should not have stayed and tried to create a pro-western liberal democracy

[Florestan]

Franco-

I agree some sort of punitive strike was called for

but we should not have stayed and tried to create a pro-western liberal democracy

Seconded on both accounts.

[Scarpia]

I suppose what is missing from the analysis in the article and others like it, is the fact that after being attacked and having over 3,000 of its citizens killed by terrorists who are based in Afghanistan, the US had little choice but to go after the perpetrators.

While I am disappointed with how this effort has been carried out (one would think that after nearly ten years Osama could have been found and killed along with his leadership) - the Afghan war had a much sounder rationale than the Iraq invasion, and I think on balance the ability of Al Qaeda to repeat another 9/11 attack has been severely crippled if not entirely eliminated.  This is due to the combined policies put in place after 9/11 of which the military campaign has been a considerable part, but still just one aspect.

As far as Gen. David Petraeus' strategy, I consider him the best person to be in the position of charting the future course for the US in Afghanistan and do not find these think-tank analysts very relevant.

Curtailing the ability to launch another attack is unrelated to imposition of a western kleptocracy on a country where the Taliban is the natural ruling class.    The attempt to "stabilize" Afghanistan with anything but the Taliban in control will fail.  The only question is how many Americans should die in the course of that failure.

[Archaic Torso of Apollo]

Meanwhile American soldiers are fighting to make the world safe for pedophilia:

http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?f=/c/a/2010/08/28/INF21F2Q9H.DTL

Ain't multiculturalism wonderful? 

[Scarpia]

Meanwhile American soldiers are fighting to make the world safe for pedophilia:

http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?f=/c/a/2010/08/28/INF21F2Q9H.DTL

Ain't multiculturalism wonderful? 

All the more reason to get out.  I wish Obama would go on television and solemnly announce, "I've analyzed all of our options, and I am going to cut and run."

[Florestan]

This whole "nation-building" thing is highly problematic, to say the least, and that the US chose to be simultaneoulsy involved in two such (expensive and bloody) exercises in futility boggles the mind.

[Todd]

...where the Taliban is the natural ruling class.

They are? 

[Florestan]

They are?

I think Scarpia might refer rather to the warrior lords in general than their strictly Taliban branch. People like Ahmad Shah Massoud or Gulbuddin Hekmatyar were not Taliban, yet they were in control of large portions of Afghan territory.

[Todd]

I think Scarpia might refer rather to the warrior lords in general than their strictly Taliban branch.

That's a not insignificant distinction.

[Josquin des Prez]

All the more reason to get out.  I wish Obama would go on television and solemnly announce, "I've analyzed all of our options, and I am going to cut and run."

If he did that, then he would have an hard time peddling whatever excuse they are cooking up to justify the invasion of Iran.

[Florestan]

That's a not insignificant distinction.

I agree.

[Franco]

This whole "nation-building" thing is highly problematic, to say the least, and that the US chose to be simultaneoulsy involved in two such (expensive and bloody) exercises in futility boggles the mind.

Yes, nation building is highly problematic, and while creating a somewhat democratic Iraq (as much as it could) that would end up more of an ally to the West than not was part of the early strategy, I think over time that aim took on less and less of an overt goal and the goal of an Iraqi government that could withstand outside forces to remain basically in the West's camp was all that remained, and I think even that level of "nation building" was never part of the Afghan policy. 

I don't think the the theory is wrong, that democracies offer a less fertile soil for the growth of global terrorism, but that what is possible in the short to midterm in the Middle East that could be called reform is far removed from creating what we would recognize as a democratic nation in Iraq.

That said, what I think is reasonable to state though is that in these conflicts, cooperation with the local populations, especially the local leaders, i.e. tribal heads, is crucial if any kind of security and stability is at all possible.  So, to the extent that cooperation was part of the tactical plan it then required a certain amount of basic societal work with the populations, as well as attempting to gain the trust of the local leaders (who would be putting themselves at risk by helping the US). 

What hurt was the Obama announcement of an exit date.  This lowered the odds of the local leaders to ally themselves with the US military since it was obvious to all that in a year the US would be gone, and there was no benefit and serious disadvantages to publically doing anything tangible to put yourself on the wrong side of the Taliban and other warlords, who would still be there after the US left.

Instead of Obama announcing a "cut and run" policy, as has been suggested in this thread, the single best thing Obama could do would be the opposite, i.e., announce that the miscalculation was in setting an exit date and now the policy is that conditions on the ground will dictate when US troops will begin to stand down.

[Scarpia]

They are?

I don't mean to imply that their rule is in any way justified or widely supported by Afghan's.  But whenever the US/Nato leaves a region the Taliban seem to end up in control.  They seem to be the only Afghan's that have the passion to fight for anything.   That gang of Warlords that were euphomistically referred to as the "Northern Alliance" don't seem to have the ability to control any significant stretch of territory.

[Florestan]

whenever the US/Nato leaves a region the Taliban seem to end up in control.  They seem to be the only Afghan's that seem to have the passion to fight for anything.

I'll reiterate my previous example: Ahmad Shah Massoud passionately fought both the Soviets and the Taliban. It might very well be that the Taliban have superior training and arms "thanks" to the ambiguous Pakistani stance on this issue.

[Scarpia]

Instead of Obama announcing a "cut and run" policy, as has been suggested in this thread, the single best thing Obama could do would be the opposite, i.e., announce that the miscalculation was in setting an exit date and now the policy is that conditions on the ground will dictate when US troops will begin to stand down.

I believe that if the US stays in Afghanistan for 100 years the Afghan campaign will be no less a complete failure.  Do we have to luxury of flushing a trillion dollars down the toilet when the US economy is faltering and the US government does not have the money to fund maintain basic infastructure, scientific research, education and the health care needs of its citizens?