Europe at War

[milk]

In the post-war and post-Cold War eras, the only allies that have pursued a foreign policy not in near-perfect alignment overall with the US are France and Turkey, and only Turkey has pursued policies sometimes directly and actively at odds with US interests.  Only a handful of countries allied with the US matter or even have the capacity to matter.  Economic power and military power - that is, hard power - ultimately determine the ability to influence events.  (Soft power is emphasized by those who lack hard power.)  Were Europe to formulate a consolidated, unified foreign policy with concomitant military power, it could act as a counterweight to the US, but Europeans can't even get monetary policy locked in properly.


I have never written that China will rise to dominance.  China is rising, India is rising, the US is declining, Russia is declining, European powers are declining.  Some African countries have the capacity to become significant regional players as well, though that will take decades.  (Perhaps Saudi Arabia or even Iran can become more influential, but the source of their income and wealth will become less significant in the next several decades, and unless they transition to more diversified economies, they will ultimately decline rapidly.)  The world is moving toward multipolarity more akin to what existed in centuries past.  Since so many people have become accustomed to a single country possessing such disproportionate power, many people appear to naturally conclude the next eighty years will be like the last eighty.  The last eighty years are historically anomalous.  This will become more clear as non-western powers become more influential, first regionally, then globally.  Many Americans, in particular, will have great difficulty adjusting.

This is a serious perspective I do think. Again, I just wonder what a serious counter-perspective might be. I doubt anyone would argue that multipolarity isn't the drift. I wonder if there is more than one place it can leave countries in the region. Your argument is that it might be better to let Taiwan go; I assume if the U.S. doesn't fight for it, no one else will, maybe not even the Taiwanese? And hawks like Bolton will argue that U.S. credibility as a power is done for if it doesn't (to which you will say "so what?). Again, I think your view is very serious and I'm still waiting for a dispassionate, knowledgeable, well-reasoned argument against your position. Isn't China's prosperity tied to good relations with most if not all of the countries with which it has territorial disputes? It's a strange world. I'm trying to image it. China takes Taiwan, and islands/areas/land from Japan, S. Korea, Philippines, Vietnam, India, Malaysia, etc. China also uses its power and influence to bankrupt countries like Sri Lanka and Laos. I guess there's no reason why Americans should care. But I wonder if it's that simple for any of these actors involved.
I do see the argument against broad liberal intervention a la Bartlet. The U.S. has a lot of blood on its hands for all the good that's hardly clear as day from the last 50 years of military operations, coups and police actions.
I'm definitely admit I'm biased against the Chinese government though.

[MusicTurner]

To invoke "madness" is just lazy and stupid, sorry. It was obvious and had been announced many times that Russia would not tolerate a "turning" of Ukraine (neither of Belarus). When the West did this 8 years ago, the conflict became hot. It's not that complicated.
The puzzling/interesting thing is that the conflict remained local (Crimea and Eastern Ukraine) with the West not really caring any more for most of the last 8 years. Then whatever happened in last fall (stationing of NATO weapons or something similar, like lots of "military advisors" in the Ukraine) apparently led to Russia taking to the ultima ratio regum again, with "the West" not ready for this, mostly because of their dependence on Russian fuel etc.

Now the European leaders (incl. the most despicable bunch heading Germany since 1945) is apparently obeying their US masters in ruining their population's wealth and energy security by idiotic embargoes that hurts Russia very little, (parts of) Europe a lot but gives good business opportunties for US LNG etc.

The US seems to be happy to ruin Europe and expend Ukrainian lives as long as it hurts Russia considerably. Because they will need the dwindling power of their crumbling Empire to stall China in the Pacific and don't want to expend too much in Europe. That's all fine, just part of great game realpolitik but the Europeans should not be as stupid as they are and do their bidding. I don't hope for serious trouble with gas etc in winter but it seems to be necessary for the Europeans to wake up. Ukraine (with no possible "victory condition") is not worth ruining the rest of the continent.

There was not some advanced, cunning Western plan to take over Ukraine, via the use of snipers at Maidan etc; Western politicians were primarily improvising during the events, when ultra-corrupt Yanukovych decided to flee. The events in 1989 were also unthinkable, until they actually and suddenly happened.

The gas problem is overrated, and certainly its economic effects, plus it mainly influences just a few EU countries. The alternative then, is the acceptance of a genocide taking place in Ukraine and the militarily executed annihilation of a state literally next door. This would be a legacy that would remain. The opinions of the Ukrainians themselves are pretty clear, and it will take several generations for the hatred towards Russians to recede, including among the Russian-speaking Ukrainians. In Bucha, 90% of the inhabitants fled; of those remaining, mostly pensioners, 10% were tortured and then killed during a few days of occupation. In the current warfare, Russia creates deserts out of towns and cities via bombardments, destroys the housing, education and culture, and then calls it peace; it suppresses the remaining part of the population completely, or forces them to become labour force, including deporting them into Russia itself; and loot the local ressources. Almost 6 million Ukrainians have fled to abroad, probably 30,000 civilians have been killed; even the Russian puppet statelets say that some of the destroyed towns just can't be rebuilt. And so on. Not to mention the massive Russian lying and propaganda, that poisons meaningful dialogue and democracy. Compared to this behaviour, focusing on 'gas prices' is simply blasphemy.

[The new erato]

There was not some advanced, cunning Western plan to take over Ukraine, via the use of snipers at Maidan etc; Western politicians were primarily improvising during the events, when ultra-corrupt Yanukovych decided to flee. The events in 1989 were also unthinkable, until they actually and suddenly happened.

The gas problem is overrated, and certainly its economic effects, plus it mainly influences just a few EU countries. The alternative then, is the acceptance of a genocide taking place in Ukraine and the militarily executed annihilation of a state literally next door. This would be a legacy that would remain. The opinions of the Ukrainians themselves are pretty clear, and it will take several generations for the hatred towards Russians to recede, including among the Russian-speaking Ukrainians. In Bucha, 90% of the inhabitants fled; of those remaining, mostly pensioners, 10% were tortured and then killed during a few days of occupation. In the current warfare, Russia creates deserts out of towns and cities via bombardments, destroys the housing, education and culture, and then calls it peace; it suppresses the remaining part of the population completely, or forces them to become labour force, including deporting them into Russia itself; and loot the local ressources. Almost 6 million Ukrainians have fled to abroad, probably 30,000 civilians have been killed; even the Russian puppet statelets say that some of the destroyed towns just can't be rebuilt. And so on. Not to mention the massive Russian lying and propaganda, that poisons meaningful dialogue and democracy. Compared to this behaviour, focusing on 'gas prices' is simply blasphemy.

Correct. And for a sobering view of how Putin played Germany,  read this:

https://www.politico.eu/article/blame-germany-russia-policy/

[Madiel]

I've just returned from a 4-day trip to Sibiu and Brașov. Lots of Ukrainian in those cities, elegantly dressed and hair-dressed, especially the ladies (make-up also), they strolled at the Zoo or in the city center, ate icecream and drank beer, chatted and laughed and did not seem particularly upset by, let alone concerned for, the fate of their country. I suspect those people were not among the hundreds of thousands who queued up at the border passes, luggage in hand and often no papers for their kids, waiting for hours to get into Romania.

Make of this what you will, I just reported the fact.

This reads rather like telling people they're grieving wrongly.

[MusicTurner]

There's been a war for 8 years, intensified during the last 6 months. From what I hear, Ukraine now has some of the most active and efficient NGO life in Europe, also concerning help during the war. Should the exiled stop enjoying life, grieve constantly also in front of their children, wear black and/or stay indoors? Of course not.

Obviously, a lot have been traumatized already.

[Que]

Correct. And for a sobering view of how Putin played Germany,  read this:

https://www.politico.eu/article/blame-germany-russia-policy/

There seems to be two very different narratives of how the current situation came about.

According to the first, Putin was provoked by an unreliable West that pushed an aggressive expansion of NATO (and of the EU).

According to the other, the West was delusional in appeasing Putin with close economic ties, blocking Ukrainian NATO membership, and not acting decisively against Russia when it annnexed the Crimea and started a proxy war in the Donbas.

[The new erato]

Two stories indeed. But I don't think story 1 was about military agression as there was none besides the fear of an independent people possibly choosing a path Putin didn't like some time in the future. Putins real fear was about the threats of ideas that could put internal Russian stabiliy at stake in the long term, and his delusions of being the last remnant of the holy Roman Empire, destined to impose its ideas on the rest of Europe. Those ideas are well known and opposed the democracy, secularity, antiracism, etc etc.

What Russia tried to do was having the cake (the Wests money and investments) and eat it too. And the West fell for it by a long way. No more.

[Que]

Two stories indeed. But I don't think story 1 was about military agression as there was none besides the fear of an indenpendent people poosibly choosing a path Putinin didn't like some time in the future. Putins real fear was about the threats of ideas that could put internal Russian stabiliy at stake in the long term, and his delusions of being the last remnant of the holy Roman Empire, destined to impose its ideas on the rest of Europe. Those ideas are well known and opposed the democracy, secularity, antiracism, etc etc.

What Russia tried to do was having the cake (the Wests money and investments) and eat it too. And the West fell for it by a long way. No more.

I happen to agree. Putin's imperial aspirations and the free choice of sovereign nations do not go together. Ultimately the West was forced - by Putin - to make a choice between the two.

[Que]

[Todd]

And hawks like Bolton will argue that U.S. credibility as a power is done for if it doesn't (to which you will say "so what?).

This type of argument is used from time to time, but what does it really mean?  Other than nothing.  Obama spoke of a red line regarding the use of chemical weapons in Syria yet did nothing when the weapons were used.  The US still possesses a good deal of credibility.  The US illegally invaded Iraq in 2003.  The world still begs the US for support rather than constructing new security alliances.  They are doing so right now over Ukraine. 

The alternative then, is the acceptance of a genocide taking place in Ukraine and the militarily executed annihilation of a state literally next door.

City-states and nation-states are political constructions that come and go over time.  The world has not achieved The End of History.  More city-states and nation-states will come and go.

Concern about genocide in Ukraine again exposes the Eurocentric and racist attitudes underpinning this war.  There is nowhere near the same outcry about the various genocides in poor, brown countries.  It is also debatable whether what is happening in Ukraine is, in fact, genocide.  From a propaganda standpoint, it makes perfect sense to use the word.

Compared to this behaviour, focusing on 'gas prices' is simply blasphemy.

It is not blasphemous at all.  It's not even religious.

According to the other, the West was delusional in appeasing Putin with close economic ties, blocking Ukrainian NATO membership, and not acting decisively against Russia when it annnexed the Crimea and started a proxy war in the Donbas.

This is the warmonger outlook.  For instance, what would "acting decisively" have looked like? 

[milk]

I seem to be the only one who thinks there are conundrums here.

[Todd]

There are definitely conundrums.  For instance, how can the US move away from militaristic foreign policy when so much economic activity and money is on the line, and how can Europeans stop being shameless security consumers, with the smallest, weakest countries voicing the strongest support for actions they cannot undertake themselves?

[Karl Henning]

Opinion  Why Kyiv's 'thousand bee sting' strategy is costing Russia dearly

[Todd]

Playing With Fire in Ukraine

The Underappreciated Risks of Catastrophic Escalation

Ukraine, for its part, has the same goals as the Biden administration. The Ukrainians are bent on recapturing territory lost to Russia—including Crimea—and a weaker Russia is certainly less threatening to Ukraine. Furthermore, they are confident that they can win, as Ukrainian Defense Minister Oleksii Reznikov made clear in mid-July, when he said, "Russia can definitely be defeated, and Ukraine has already shown how." His U.S. counterpart apparently agrees. "Our assistance is making a real difference on the ground," Austin said in a late July speech. "Russia thinks that it can outlast Ukraine—and outlast us. But that's just the latest in Russia's string of miscalculations."

[Madiel]

I seem to be the only one who thinks there are conundrums here.

Rather, you seem to be under the misapprehension for the second time in as many weeks that people are obliged to respond to your posts in the way that you want and on your timetable. Whether it's films or Ukraine, the mistake is the same.

[drogulus]

     If there is overlap between Washington and Kyiv it's not because Ukraine doesn't have its own sufficient reasons to defend itself. I allow reasons to coincide and diverge how they may.

     US policy is as militaristic as it is because global power relations, like nature, abhor a vacuum. The US can't have the economic power it has without the power to sustain it. The US does so with a remarkably small percentage of its GDP devoted to the military.

     

     The US has learned how to defend itself and its allies very efficiently. I appreciate that. Many seem to be unaware of this simple fact and bloviate about suzereignity. It takes all kinds.

     

[Todd]

Actual US-alone military expenditure as a proportion of GDP in 2020 was about 3.75%



...as also confirmed at https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/MS.MIL.XPND.GD.ZS?locations=US

That is for the top line DOD budget.  It excludes the Department of Energy budget.  It excludes the Department of Homeland Security budget.  It excludes the Department of Veterans Affairs budget.  It excludes unclassified and classified expenditures by intelligence agencies.  It excludes national security related expenditures included in other federal agencies (eg, the Department of Agriculture).  Actual national security spending is much higher. 

People will often point to the even higher percentages of GDP devoted to the military in the past, as if that has any meaning.  Aside from the fact that it demonstrates that the US economy in the post-war era has been too dependent on military spending generally, it also ignores fiscal and demographic changes.  That is, the percentage of federal expenditures devoted to transfer payments keeps going up, and rising rates will very soon result in material increases in debt service outlays for the $31 trillion+ in federal debt - the weighted average maturity of Treasuries is just over five years. 

[Todd]

It is self-explanatory and requires no further input from you to attempt to 'clarify'.

It is true that some people prefer to use incomplete information.

[drogulus]

I am not sure about your graph. It has a label 'world', and shows %GDP of military expenditure at somewhere less than 2.5%.

Actual US-alone military expenditure as a proportion of GDP in 2020 was about 3.75%



...as also confirmed at https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/MS.MIL.XPND.GD.ZS?locations=US

I'm not sure if that counts as 'remarkably small'. It's disappointing it's that high, to my mind. It is at least down from the 9%+ it was during the Vietnam years, though, so there's that...

     The World Bank chart on your link is slightly different from the one I showed. It makes the same point.

     The US economy is highly dependent on the effectiveness of US military spending. It's doubleplusgood that such a small portion of the budget is needed.

     Considering that a huge part of the economy relies on tech developed for military purposes initially I'd say defense has 2 ways of being bang for buck efficient.

[milk]

There are definitely conundrums.  For instance, how can the US move away from militaristic foreign policy when so much economic activity and money is on the line, and how can Europeans stop being shameless security consumers, with the smallest, weakest countries voicing the strongest support for actions they cannot undertake themselves?

I was thinking of other things as well. I mean that's so if one accepts that the U.S. should reduce the MIC (is that an accepted acronym? military industrial complex? ). I was thinking of questions about how the U.S. decides to engage in wars. I look at the 20th century and see blood on the hands of the U.S. government, from Vietnam to Indonesia to "East Pakistan," to Chile and on and on. Yet I tremble to think of a world left to the devices of Stalin and Mao. And it's a conundrum to me what to do with the world the way it is today. I'm not ready to say that the U.S. should pull itself out of everywhere, should cede the world to tyrants, yet I can't dismiss out of hand the argument that the U.S. is beholden to militarists and war profiteers and that U.S. "mistakes" are gigantic, bloody, frequent and predictable.
If it turns out that Ukraine falls this year, I will be wondering why the U.S. was there. If it succeeds, I think it will be a great triumph and a foothold for something (democracy?) in the 21st century. How far the U.S. should go in Asia is a conundrum. It's never answered clearly in the U.S. policy as far as I know, which is weird. They keep hinting, winking, etc. Does China think the U.S. will actually got to war over it? Anyway, I know in the case of China, you believe there isn't a conundrum. Maybe you could entertain what the worst fears of the other side are, to test that idea.
It's a separate conundrum in itself to discover how the U.S. can ever cut its military budget.
Here's an aside: I readily admit something about psychology that may be true for all of us: do we arrive at our convictions through reasoning and defend that reasoning? Or do we we have some sort of intuition that we are defending? I saw Jonathan Haidt discussing this. It may be that it's my intuition that I'm defending here. That's maybe what everyone does to some extent sometimes.
ETA there are people who still defend Kissinger and all his nefarious Cold War shenanigans.

Rather, you seem to be under the misapprehension for the second time in as many weeks that people are obliged to respond to your posts in the way that you want and on your timetable. Whether it's films or Ukraine, the mistake is the same.

I apologize if you feel I've imposed something out of line. I try to stay within bound but I'm not as well-read on European politics or history as everyone here. Still, I'll try to do my best not to cross the line in the future. Thanks.