Einstein, Buddhism and the necessity of the absolute

[Sean]

I wrote this in 1996 so the English isn't all it might be but I've added these notes to a file I'm going to proofread- any thoughts read with interest.

Even Einstein still had to postulate an absolute (the laws of physics) in order to extend the range of relative phenomena ie phenomena whose values are dependent on the observer's relationship with them. Indeed if everything was relative, with no absolute, reality would collapse...

The Buddhists can further point out however that, as demonstrated in Einstein's Theory of Relativity, all motion without exception is relative an there is in fact then no physical universal reference frame, such as, in the above analogy, a ground, from which it can all ultimately be measured that scientists previous to him had assumed to exist. There is no physical unchanging or non-moving position in the world. The Indians' viewpoint is to say that an object may have another object moving relative to it but if the first object is also to be said to be moving then there has to be a ground, or something, that it is moving relative to: just as the second object needs the first in order for it to be said that it is moving, the first needs something in exactly the same way: something at some point must just not be moving. It is true that this argument for the existence of the substantive Self by analogy with a need for a non-moving position is at odds with Einstein. As the Indians argue however, it is indeed the case that there has to be a non-moving position or universal reference frame in the world from which all motion can ultimately be measured because although all motion itself is discovered to be relative- the complete system of it as a whole has still crucially to be measured from a, now higher order, non-moving position. Einstein's entire theory is founded on the acceptance of the view that not everything in the world can be relative but that there must be an absolute, consisting in such a position; he is no exception in this respect to the line of scientists and thinkers before him. It would be inconsistent to say that everything was relative because there would be at least the non-relative truth that everything is relative. It is merely that the assumption held since Newton that the non-moving position is a physical one is false because Einstein shows that the very nature of all physical objects, such as grounds, themselves are wholly among the relative features of change of the world, and of course the non-moving position the Indians argue for is then not a physical one. If the Indians postulated their Self, the non-moving position or the absolute, as anything physical this would then make it part of the relative realm and not the absolute. All Einstein does is to replace the universal reference frame or the absolute consisting in the previous idea of something physical, which was held to the ether- and unmoving, frictionless substance permeating all space, with the more abstract idea of the non-physical laws of physics. The relative realm, Einstein shows, in fact comprises not just the changing states of the matter of all physical objects but also the very value of the matter itself, and along with even the values of energy, space and time; they can all change, hence making th4m inherently relative, and so non can constitute the true universal reference frame, the backcloth or absolute against which to measure the change in this realm. Conversely however the laws of physics are forever without change because of the fact that actually they have nothing to change to: because they are the foundation of the world if they changed everything else would change with them and no change as such could be detected. Nothing can change relative to itself; the idea of change becomes meaningless here. Where the universal reference frame consisting in the laws of physics is to be found is actually in one's own position, or anyone's- regardless of how one appears to be moving relative to other objects. The non-moving position is imply always one's own position; one appears stationary and unchanging to oneself and the laws of physics here are the same as those for all other objects, moving and changing or otherwise. No matter what kind of change at all is happening around oneself there must constantly exist a changeless absolute level in one's position in order to ground it all. This non-moving position consisting in no more than the laws of physics- the absolute here, is the Self or consciousness- within oneself, the root of one's position, because as this is the ultimate position from which all motion takes place, it is accordingly also that from which all observation- and hence consciousness, of motion, change or anything, takes place.

Although without something physical comprising the universal reference frame or the absolute like the ether all motion indeed then becomes relative, the non-physical laws of physics of one's own position are instead to be taken as the absolute because one's position is no more relative than all other positions- all positions are equivalent. The absolute has to be something abstract and non-physical since it is the same thing as the abstract Self and, in line with Vedic monism where the relative realm is only the absolute realm in relative form, it is in the very foundation of one's relative position in the relative realm that the absolute realm is to be found- the laws of physics. (Ie the transcendent is immanent.) A complete account of the laws of physics that physicists are working towards is the unified field- the foundation or essence of the relative realm, and explanations of physical reality by science will indeed stop here because one is making reference to the truth, not to anything in the relative realm which will always require further explanation and discussion. It also seems however that the unified field will never be described in full just because of the fat that it is the absolute and the Self: it is the foundation of the world and therefore constitutes our basis from which all the relative realm may then be described or theorized about. It cannot itself be subject to such description- it is just the primary field of being or 'is'ness. To describe something one must occupy a position separate to it and this is impossible with the Self since it is what people, and all things, ultimately are. A description of the fundamentals of reality or the unified field would itself be part of the reality and so, because such description will then inevitably exclude itself from the description, it will always be less than full or objective; one cannot stop outside of reality to acquire its complete discursive description. One can only experience or be the fundamental level of reality or the Self, not really describe it. The mind cannot be seen to be constituted by its relative levels aloe because there is always more to reality than discursive description in that a position separate to this is always required for it to be carried out. Accordingly there is always more to reality than the change, or characteristics, of the relative realm that description only ever and can only ever describe and it is further indeed the case that that which takes note of change cannot itself be changing. No matter what the state of the relative world or mind is, the unchanging Self must exist, underlying it all. The unchanging absolute exists in order for the relative realm to have something ultimately to be relative to; it is not possible for everything to be relative.

(Note the absolute, represented here by the speed of light, isn't a reference frame of the usual relative sort that the rest of reality, ie the relative world, can make final reference to to make it real- it's a transcendental reference, beyond rational reconciliation etc.)

In criticism of the Vedic conception, with it being singular and universal in character yet also, unlike individual selves, substantive in that a person's characteristics are possessed by it- their thoughts and acts requiring a thinker and agent and not existing per se, there is the usual acute problem of how to account for the unity of the mind. A universal Self should fail to explain how any of the characteristics such as the mental states, perceptions of thoughts of the discursive mind of a certain person can be ascribed only to them and not everyone, sharing the universal Self that does the experiencing, perceiving or thinking: there should only be no more than the individual self of the non-substantive sum of a person's characteristics; at most the self could be something more than this but ultimately intangible and evanescent. The kind of reply to this that the Indians would want to advance is that perceptions cannot in the first place be ascribed to a certain person in a meaningful way- this is because perceptions can be taken in different ways, for instance a picture that is either a vase or two faces. Any of a person's characteristics, such as their perceptions, are indeterminate an merely relative- being that realm, to the state of the discursive level of mind and so trying to ascribe them to the person is ultimately an empty, inconsequential pursuit. The Self however, separate to this level of mind of perceptions, is the very consciousness or witnessing of them and all people have this same universal think- whatever the perceptions are taken to be. There is only one perceiving Self because there is necessarily only one absolute realm of changelessness where consciousness of change resides There cannot be more than one absolute because the necessarily characteristicslessness and featurelessness of it means there would be no distinction to be made between absolutes in a plurality of them. However, the problem of the unity of the mind is not well answered here: perceptions may not necessarily be those they are taken to be and so lose meaning but it is the case that there is still a perception one person is having, howsoever it is being had, that all others are not. Even if perceptions can be made ultimately meaningless they will always, it seems, consist in something, which a person cannot ignore, and so it is not then the case that perceptions cannot be ascribed to a person in a meaningful way. Also, although there may further be the example of the soldier who is able to ignore the pain from their injuries until after the battle and thus indeed avoid perceptions here being ascribed to them at all, it is hard to imagine perceptions of kinds other than pleasure or pain or illusions not necessarily being those they are taken to be: a perception of whiteness is never taken to be blackness. How what then still appears to be the fact of the perceptions of a certain person can be ascribed only to them and not everyone under this theory of a universal perceiving Self consequently remains intractable.

The Buddhists (both Mahayana and Theravada schools), having split from Hinduism and the Vedic tradition in the 6th century BC, hold there is no substantive Self having existence independent of the grosser levels of a person's mind. A person consists just in a paradigm or series of changing mental states tht rest on no substratum. This series is a source of illusion and the idea of any substantive self or 'I' is merely one more illusory thing that arises purely from the series itself. However, ultimately there is also no non-substantive self or sum of a person's characteristics either, even one just comprised of the series. The series gives rise to the idea of this also: the existence of the series is therefore also an illusion, given rise to by itself. Whereas the Indians also assert the changing mental states are all that there is, as such, there being in fact no reality at all. For the Indians, the idea of enlightenment is founded on a doctrine of eternalism but for the Buddhists it is founded on one of annihilationism because as the illusion or the series of mental states itself, along with what the series seems variously to mean, is perceived, what is left is said to be not a Self or any such thing remaining but nothing whatsoever.

Against this kind of theory the Buddhists have problems of accounting for the unity of the mind similar to those the Indians have to deal with: if every mental state is its own subject it is then hard to explain how more than one state can be ascribed to the same person, and hence also how the processes of memory and recognition can work. Denying the existence of any substantive self means this problem is even more acute than in the Vedic conception of it- with it being universal, but in reply the Buddhists may argue that the assumption of the truth of memory is itself ill-established, though there is then the further argument that although one's memory or whole mind may indeed be subject to change, the Self remains required as a condition for either any knowledge or moral reasoning at all- in as far as there should be a knower of knowledge or reasoner of reasoning of some description behind any set of changeable mental states involved.

The Buddhist enlightenment or nivana is where all desire has ceased and where the reality of not-self or anatta- there being no substantive Self, or even a non-substantive self, is realized. Here, all sense of 'I' along with any self disappears and even statements such as 'I am' are seen to be conceits. The data of experience is not converted into theoretical beliefs or views but is instead just experienced in its now remaining true uninterpreted nature. When all interpretations of experience, including even ones like 'I enjoy' or 'I dislike' are dropped, one then knows the reality, in as far as it is real, of the series of mental states existing alone, per se and purporting to nothing else. The Indians though would argue here that the not-self theory is unnecessary as a means to overcome desire, along with attachment and suffering associated with it for the resaon that the essential nature of the Self is actually featureless and so does not itself include these in the first place. These things are related only to the other levels of mind and so fall away on one's alignment with the Self.

In support of their unchanging Self distinct and independent from the series of changing mental states the Indians argue for the idea that what it is in people that takes note of the change in the states cannot itself be changing. Analogously this would apply to anything that is to take note of change: for example an object that is moving at the same speed in the same direction as another can take no note of the others' speed- because its position relative to the other is not changing. They are both changing their position relative to the stationary ground in the same way at the same rate. The observer that is the Self can hence never be reduced to one of the mental states because there always has to be something unchanging, as there is in this case a ground, against which to measure change- or from which to take note of change. Against this though it may for the Buddhists seem that instead of something unchanging, all that is required is different rates of change, for the change to be taken note of. However, it really must be the case that everything cannot be just a rate of change because at the end of the line of change in things relative to other things there will be one last thing that has nothing for its change to be relative to, and there cannot here be change relative to itself- since it cannot detach itself from itself to observe it: the ideas of change becomes completely meaningless at this point, and this thing is the unchanging Self. A first thing or observer can observe rates of change in something that is other than them, such as a second observer- as long as it is a change relative to any state of change within first observer, and further rates of change in further observers relative to the change in the second observer can be observed by them, but there always needs ultimately to be an unchanging position from which to observe the first rate of change. In reality therefore, the first rate of change there must really be is the second observer here because the ideas of any change within the first is really meaningless: they cannot ever change because if they did this would have to be relative to some prior first observer, who did not change. The first observer hence must comprise the position from which to observe this first rate of change, and what they actually comprise in the real world is the silent witness of change, consciousness, or the Self. Further, the activity or thinking of the discursive level of mind when it is not aligned with the Self is like change being observed by observers who are themselves changing: ultimately this observation is therefore only on a relative or essentially ungrounded level because it is itself relative to the unchanging position or level in the mind or the world- the Self, the level of the non-relative, the absolute, the unique, different kin of position from which to observe the first rate of change and, because this is the end of the line of relative change or accordingly the real end of the line of a process of deliberation over something in the thinking of the discursive mind, the place where the final truth that such deliberation seeks lies. In enlightenment, all of the change that takes place in the discursive level of mind is directly relative to the Self, and not to other thoughts. One's thought and action is direct from the Self, and, being from the level of the non-relative and the truth at the end of all deliberation, there wholly perfect.

Moreover, if the Buddhists' belief in reincarnation is to be meaningful, in as far as that which does the transmigration into a new body is something that persists as the same throughout, there is some conflict here with the not-self theory as this something seems very hard to describe as anything other than a substantive self of a sort. Furthermore, in asserting the transience and lack of essential nature of all things, it seems they have themselves the problem that the reality of this arguably constitutes a conception of an absolute; again, if everything is an illusion there is at least the non-illusory truth of this, contradicting their position. However despite this, the Buddhists insist that if the Vedic Self is absolute and then separate to our activity and psycho-physical constituents of the relative realm then it must not only be inapprehensible and inaccessible but be a complete blank and as such unable to constitute what it is that does our feeling, thinking and acting. The Indians here can only make the point that although it is true that the Self, being the absolute, cannot be properly apprehended or described by the relative mind, it crucially remains instead to be experienced, and in this important sense is not at all inaccessible. The absolute level of mind is something only to be, not describe- it is the position from which description issues. A separated and distinct absolute Self however should further be inaccessible and impossible to refer to or contact and have no causal work to do due to its different, unchanging nature: eternal causes should surely only have eternal effects. The featureless, absolute, abstract and non-physical Self should not be able to interact with the more physical-like self- the relative levels of the mind, or body. Further, if the Self is the real doer or instigator of acts, it can be asked what instigates the instigator. There should be an implausible endless series of Vedic Selves within a person and so really there should only exist, at most, the non-substantive self. In answer to these points the Indians argue for their monist doctrine where the essential nature of the relative realm is ultimately the absolute or the Self, and so with the two sharing the same essential natures there are no true gaps to bridge. The Self interacts with the self- thoughts and actions proceeding from and being possessed by the Self, just in the same way that the absolute in the form of the non-physical laws of physics interacts with the purely physical aspect of the relative realm- and actions in the physical realm then proceeding from these underlying laws. Physics can then monistically describe the foundation of this realm in terms of the laws of physics or unified field and so it is that there is no interactionist problem here. The Buddhists reject this argument however as incoherent because, they claim, for the Self to really have meaning as the absolute, it cannot both be absolute and relative, there being ultimately no distinction. If there is no distinction then it is just another of one's relative or gross and illusory characteristics or mental states, not a possessor or witness of them or anything of such a finer nature. Everything, as clearly perceived in higher states of consciousness, is ultimately gross changing relative not unchanging absolute. The correct way of conceiving of a person for them is just as a series of what are relative changing mental states, where, before enlightenment and for example in the case of Indian philosophers, the mental states that happen to be the manufactured ideas of the substantive Self or even only of one's non-substantive self may simply be superimposed on the rest of the series- this process coming to consist in what is of course one's misplaced belief in the actual truth of such ideas (but the Self isn't an idea, etc). Rather than the Self, reality, in as far as it is real at all, is just a perceptual process or becoming. Against this though the Indians accept that it can then in fact be in a way true to say that due to the fact that a person's relative characteristics or self, like all the relative realm, are founded on the absolute the person is no more than the sum of those characteristics- as long as it is understood that of course the relative is indeed never purely or intrinsically relative: there must be an absolute truth within, yet ultimately indistinct from, the relative in order to ground or possess it. 'I' does refer to the absolute, the Self or consciousness, which is really the correct way of conceiving of a person.