Would Polytheism Be Better For Us ?

[drogulus]

You should have been a lawyer: you're a master of sophistry, of turning things upside down to appear what they are not and of twisting the ideas of your opponents.

The idea that atheism leads to enlightenment, liberation from delusion and a better world and that people of faith are less enlightened, trapped in delusions and prone to violence and evil has repeatedly surfaced on this forum and it was always atheists that expounded it --- and this is my whole idea? If I have repeatedly refuted a recurrent idea, this means it is my idea? So much for your verificationist logic.

"What about the other causes?" was exactly my question. Presenting it to be yours and somehow opposed to my approach is disingenuous in the highest degree.

     I have been consistent in this. Most atheists are not superhuman reasoners, they are just good ones. And the idea that you have ownership of the "other causes" argument is really dumb. This idea is a commonplace among believers and nonbelievers. Atheism doesn't cure cancer. Don't be a simpleton by accusing me of not being entitled to my own ideas. I don't dispute your right to them, so stop this foolishness.

[Fëanor]

When I was an atheist I thought exactly this way.  This view seems entirely sensible until you pull the argument apart.  The crux of the matter comes down to this statement.

"I see no objective, compelling evidence of his/her existence and it seems exceedingly unlikely."

It depends upon how you define "objective".  If objective means that it is factual, regardless of whether or not anyone agrees it is true, then you are assuming Truth (capital T for universal) exists.  If you believe there is no such thing as Truth, then there is no such thing as right or wrong.  If there is no Truth, then if I believe God exists, He exists, but if you believe He doesn't, then He doesn't.  But God cannot both exist and not exist, so you are either talking about something else than the traditional understanding of God or you have a contradiction.  So, continuing, lets assume you are appealing, in your statement, to an objective Truth.

If objective Truth exists, then it means there is some standard upon which all arguments and evidence are judged.  For example, science is typically seen as getting closer to an objective reality.  Scientific consensus tells us how things really are, not just good ways to make calculations, right?  But this appeal has implications.  It means there is a right and a wrong.  If atoms really exist, then science is right, because there is some actual reality in which little balls of matter are really there.  Similarly, if God really doesn't exist, then the atheist is absolutely right, because out there in reality, there really is no God.  These statements cannot be made without objective Truth existing.

But where does this objective Truth reside?  How is there some standard that applies to everyone?  Somehow, out there, there is some entity or consciousness permeating us all upon which we are all judged.  That is, if objective Truth exists.  All of this brings up a question.  Who or what made this objective Truth?  Where did it come from?  Is it just some property of the universe?

It cannot be just some property of the universe because Truth is a metaphysical entity.  You cannot make a Truth-o-meter to test for objective reality.  It must be imposed from a different level.  This implies an entity outside the universe exists.  What else could have created it?

So the very act of judging is a statement of the correctness of a particular thing in relation to objective Truth, but Truth implies a God, or at least some "other" objective entity, but this is usually what we call God.

So ironically, the statement, "God does not exist" implies God exists.

You'll need to explain all this to me again. The "Truth" is every other sentence above seems to contain an error or  non sequitur.

[drogulus]

There is a lot of confusion here.  Dawkins, Hitchens, and others often compare atheism as simply not believing in God with religions and their ideology.  They should be comparing it to simply believing in God (or possibly the gods,as per this thread!).

     I think they do that, but this does tend to support the idea that atheists should make it clear that they are primarily concerned with the existence question and only secondarily with the question of benefits and costs. I'd like that to be the case, that these questions be more clearly defined. We can compare atheist and theist institutions and weigh them on their respective merits without deciding the existence question. I would prefer to concentrate on the essentials. Arguments about what is true or what exists shouldn't be conditioned by these other considerations. It would tend to prejudice the argument towards who is good or who is nice in who's opinion. That would give a big advantage to those who feel they have a weak argument. They could accuse their opponents of insulting a perfect being (just as an example) . Justice and a disinterested concern for truth demands that these miscreants be stopped!!

     Uh....sorry about that, I got carried away.

     But you see what I mean. A strategically deployed sense of outrage should not be a feature of an argument. If it is it should be sidestepped. I find it's disconcerting to an opponent when you continually and underhandedly return to the point and proceed with substantive argument.

[Brian]

You'll need to explain all this to me again. The "Truth" is every other sentence above seems to contain an error or  non sequitur.

Indeed; my head was spinning by the end, although I did remember why I decided to stop taking philosophy courses.

[Florestan]

     Don't be a simpleton by accusing me of not being entitled to my own ideas.

It was not a metter of ideas, but of questions. It seems that no matter what I write you either misunderstand or misrepresent it. I'm not going to continue this pointless exchange anymore.

[DavidRoss]

You'll need to explain all this to me again. The "Truth" is every other sentence above seems to contain an error or  non sequitur.

For sooth.

[karlhenning]

Don't be a simpleton by accusing me of not being entitled to my own ideas.

This is a knot of logical error, Ernie.  Anyone who indicates to you (accuse is hardly the right verb, is it?) that you are not "entitled to your own ideas", does not thereby become a simpleton.

You've got some neurons to straighten out there, lad.

[Brian]

For sooth.

Forsooth, I will hold my tongue.

[drogulus]

This is a knot of logical error, Ernie.  Anyone who indicates to you (accuse is hardly the right verb, is it?) that you are not "entitled to your own ideas", does not thereby become a simpleton.

You've got some neurons to straighten out there, lad.

     I chose the wrong word. The correct meaning got through, though.

[karlhenning]

     I chose the wrong word.

More than one, actually 

[Elgarian]

On another thread recently there was mention of the first "chapter" of Tao from Tao Te Ching, the first lines of which read "The Ways that can be explained are not the eternal Way; the names that can be named are not the eternal Name."

Not only are words inadequate to communicate understanding of things which must be experienced to be known, but the difficulty is compounded when we mistake the words and concepts they represent for the things themselves, forgetting that they are only approximations--descriptions at best, limited by our experience and the conceptual frameworks to which we apply them.  How often we mistake the finger for the moon!

Yes. Again and again.

I've been away for a while and the number of posts here is too much to catch up on - it took me a while to find this of yours, buried way back in page 22 .... but whenever these science v religion discussions crop up, with their category-error fireworks blowing off everywhere, I always want to unfurl a flag bearing Whitehead's words, writ large:

"Much philosophic thought is based upon the faked adequacy of some account of various modes of human experience ... the final outlook of Philosophic thought cannot be based on the exact statements which form the basis of special sciences.
The exactness is a fake."

Once you grasp that, and its implications, it's impossible ever to make the mistake again - not of hoping the discussion might ever reach a conclusion, but of thinking that there's a real discussion there at all.

[DavidRoss]

Almost from the day you popped up here I've suspected you were one of Sophia's lovers, Elgarian.  We split up long ago, but we're still friends.

[Elgarian]

Almost from the day you popped up here I've suspected you were one of Sophia's lovers, Elgarian.  We split up long ago, but we're still friends.

Yes, but for some time now I've not been a very faithful lover. I confess to dalliances elsewhere, though she always seems to welcome me back for the occasional fling.

[drogulus]

"Much philosophic thought is based upon the faked adequacy of some account of various modes of human experience ... the final outlook of Philosophic thought cannot be based on the exact statements which form the basis of special sciences.
The exactness is a fake."

     Yes, not only is there doubt that ones experience is what you believe it is, the belief is embedded in language which is inadequate. The word god names something, it's assumed. The thing it names can't be defined or shown. How is something being named? What's it like to experience something without describable qualities? Wouldn't the honest answer be indescribable? No, because when something can't be described it's decribed anyway, by metaphor.


     Look at it this way. If you were "touched by the hand of god" how would you describe it? Even better, what would have to happen to you to describe it as being "touched by the hand of god"? We aren't a bunch of Scalia's here! There's no 'Black Letter" god-hand-touching experience that we just know we've had. Without fail every single person who experiences such an event is describing something new. Since there's no common understanding of the experience, no reference point outside of texts and more metaophor, it doesn't seem that there's any way to tell what is really causing the experience. All the harumphing about why experience must be literally taken as true without examination misses this point: often it can't be determined what is being said. Clearly this applies to the speaker as well. For everyone else both the experience and any description are subject to legitimate doubt.

[Elgarian]

Yes, not only is there doubt that ones experience is what you believe it is, the belief is embedded in language which is inadequate. The word god names something, it's assumed. The thing it names can't be defined or shown. How is something being named? What's it like to experience something without describable qualities? Wouldn't the honest answer be indescribable? No, because when something can't be described it's decribed anyway, by metaphor.

I agree with most of this, but I hover uneasily over your suggestion that the 'thing' can't be shown. I want to qualify that. That's where the metaphor comes in, and indeed that's one of the reasons why art of all kinds is so important to us. It moves us away from the telling, towards the showing. The metaphor (or the art) is more than an attempt to 'describe anyway'; it's an attempt to show. Or at least, to offer the kind of contemplative or perceptive journey that might result in the perceiver experiencing this indescribable 'thing' for himself. (That's one reason why, I think, art and religion often get muddled up. Both are geared towards experiences that lie beyond the adequacy of language.)

Without fail every single person who experiences such an event is describing something new. Since there's no common understanding of the experience, no reference point outside of texts and more metaphor, it doesn't seem that there's any way to tell what is really causing the experience. All the harumphing about why experience must be literally taken as true without examination misses this point: often it can't be determined what is being said. Clearly this applies to the speaker as well.

Yes; although I'd want to add at least one codicil to this manifesto before I could sign up to it:

If we dig down far enough into the scientific process, we eventually find ourselves confronted by the same indeterminacy; despite the success of (let's say) the Schrodinger wave equation and the Uncertainty Principle at predicting outcomes, issues of 'truth' are no less indeterminate. You would reject the principle 'if it predicts well, it must be true' just as rapidly as I would; it simply isn't so. We do not know what the underlying reality is that causes the Schrodinger wave equation to be a good predictor. As DavidRoss said somewhere here, we must be careful not to confuse the descriptor with the thing. Indeed, my experience of the presence of this desk, here in front of me, is no less mysterious than Blake's experience of angels in a tree. It's just more familiar (because repeatable, and therefore checkable), so I feel as if I understand it better.

For everyone else both the experience and any description are subject to legitimate doubt.

I think this is true of all human experience.

[Homo Aestheticus]

Orthodox jews are extremely rigid and want to live by themselves.  It's best that they do just that. 

True...And this just in:

Beginning of the end of Orthodox hegemony

http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/1088815.html

****

Thank goodness that their days of control are numbered.

[drogulus]

     Elgarian, I think we are approaching this in a similar way. Our impressions can be subject to different categorizations.

     About the quantum results and reality as a prediction fulfilled, that's the basis of my view. You say:

     We do not know what the underlying reality is that causes the Schrodinger wave equation to be a good predictor.

     Quite so, and like a good pragmatist I say that our concept of truth is antimetaphysical and questions about the underlying reality don't affect it. The "real world" is a necessary hypothesis, the reason behind all this. Our theories and confirmations are otherwise freestanding, without need of justification from this theory. They merely point to a world as an inference or as Ayer said a "logical construction out of sense data". So pragmatism produces an odd sort of "realism". Some would say it's not realism at all, but I think it is, sort of.

[Bulldog]

True...And this just in:

Beginning of the end of Orthodox hegemony

http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/1088815.html

****

Thank goodness that their days of control are numbered.

I was talking about orthodox jews in the United States.  The article you mention is about Israel.  Also, don't get so euphoric about events in Israel - it's just the words of one person.

Again, I have to say that your concentration on this matter strikes me as very odd.

[Elgarian]

Quite so, and like a good pragmatist I say that our concept of truth is antimetaphysical and questions about the underlying reality don't affect it. The "real world" is a necessary hypothesis, the reason behind all this. Our theories and confirmations are otherwise freestanding, without need of justification from this theory. They merely point to a world as an inference or as Ayer said a "logical construction out of sense data". So pragmatism produces an odd sort of "realism". Some would say it's not realism at all, but I think it is, sort of.

That decision "our concept of truth is antimetaphysical" is the one I question. That's why Whitehead's statement is so important. By excluding the metaphysical at the outset, and adopting an approach to the world that we might agree to call 'scientific' (can we?), we do, of course, succeed in creating a self-consistent system which requires no reference to metaphysics. How could it? We excluded that possibility before we began. My point is that the statement 'truth is antimetaphysical' is not one that we derive from the findings of science; it's an assumption we make at the outset. A pragmatist is a pragmatist not because science has persuaded him in that direction; he's a pragmatist because he's decided to be a pragmatist. Questions that don't satisfy the entry requirements into the scheme are rejected from the system's modes of enquiry so that certain kinds of exact statements can be made with a certain kind of confidence (subject to repeatability/falsifiability tests and so on), and there's undeniably a kind of comfort in that. It makes the ground seem solid even though it isn't. But as Whitehead says - the exactness is a fake.

Now the rejected questions may be nought but fluff. I make no claims for them at this point. But that area where the preliminary exclusions/inclusions occur - that fuzzy blob wherein these metaphysical (or antimetaphysical) decisions are made - that's the one that interests me. Those initial decisions are crucial. Because after all, there's no point in asking a pragmatist what was happening when Blake saw the angel in the tree: I know what he'll say.

[drogulus]

     Elgarian, I have to go on a pizza expedition. This is very interesting so I'll get back to you.