Richard Dawkins' The God Delusion, and Hinduism

[Elgarian]

Yes, they have a belief about beliefs, that they are true.

That's a different story. I'm talking about the story that goes like this: "I perceive something unknown. I believe what I have perceived is real. I will call it a spondulator." Now, you may or not see spondulators yourself (for many possible reasons), and you may (as I know you will) question the original perception that gave rise to their naming; but the name has been attached to something that the believer believes to be real. The perceived reality comes before the naming.

Your story (as I understood it when you first proposed it) goes: "spondulators have been named, therefore they must be real; so I will believe in them". There may indeed be people who follow that trail, but neither of us would take them seriously. They can be set aside in the 'straw men' enclosure.

Other than that, they have no reasons, only the motive to protect a particular belief.

Some believers may indeed believe without reason, but for the moment let's put them also with the straw men, and consider the the more interesting case of the believers who do claim grounds for their belief, but they're grounds that don't (for whatever reason) satisfy the non-believers. That's where the real discussion has to take place.

Afterthought: I think I ought to add that the motive issue isn't going to help us, because it doesn't discriminate between the two camps. For every believer whose primary motive is to protect his belief, you're going to find a non-believer whose primary motive is to protect his non-belief.

[Catison]

Elgarian,

Please continue writing because I am learning a lot from your posts.  But please don't expect Ernie (drogulus) to appreciate the basics of philosophy.  He is stuck in Philosophy 101 with a failing grade.

[knight66]

Elgarian,

Please continue writing because I am learning a lot from your posts. 

Ditto here.

Mike

[Elgarian]

It's kind of you to say so (Mike and Brett) but please don't assume that I know more than I do. (I said to DavidRoss the other day that my own understanding of this stuff is as full of holes as a sieve.) I have to feel my way, inch by inch, because the crucial thing is to try to unravel the multiple issues welded together in these discussions (and impossible to deal with meaningfully in that form) to find out what, if anything, can be discussed with some possibility of resolution.

I won't knock Ernie, though. He probably won't like my saying so, even though I mean it as a compliment, but he's a visionary; and his descriptions of the way he approaches the problems as he sees them are sometimes inspiring. I think he takes us on the wrong journey, but he shows us some interesting sights along the way.

[drogulus]

That's a different story. I'm talking about the story that goes like this: "I perceive something unknown. I believe what I have perceived is real. I will call it a spondulator." Now, you may or not see spondulators yourself (for many possible reasons), and you may (as I know you will) question the original perception that gave rise to their naming; but the name has been attached to something that the believer believes to be real. The perceived reality comes before the naming.

Your story (as I understood it when you first proposed it) goes: "spondulators have been named, therefore they must be real; so I will believe in them". There may indeed be people who follow that trail, but neither of us would take them seriously. They can be set aside in the 'straw men' enclosure.

Some believers may indeed believe without reason, but for the moment let's put them also with the straw men, and consider the the more interesting case of the believers who do claim grounds for their belief, but they're grounds that don't (for whatever reason) satisfy the non-believers. That's where the real discussion has to take place.

Afterthought: I think I ought to add that the motive issue isn't going to help us, because it doesn't discriminate between the two camps. For every believer whose primary motive is to protect his belief, you're going to find a non-believer whose primary motive is to protect his non-belief.

    That isn't exactly how I would describe the distinction I'm making. I'm proposing that things that consist of names and nothing public that can be attached to them be considered as true reports of experience which stand in need of explanation of the cause for them. If the cause can't be found in the world then the efficient explanation is that the cause of the experience is internal to the person having it. Since there are many such cases where this is uncontroversially true about nonreligious subjects the only problem I see is the resistance the believer displays to the reallocation from supernatural to natural explanation.

     Or are you saying that the normal procedure of imputing natural causes in preference to unnatural ones, universal in science and everyday life, and without which no causal investigation could ever proceed to a fruitful end, should be short-circuited because it's objected to?

    Science and all methods for the finding of fact operate using natural assumptions because that's the only way they can work. I take the somewhat anomalous position that there is no real distinction to be made between the operational and the purportedly metaphysical. So, from the standpoint of the ontological/epistemological, science is philosophy, and the negative view scientists frequently have towards philosophy as a discipline dovetails neatly with the common view among them that they have what they need and don't need to bother with it further. I reinterpret this a little as science precluding anti-scientific philosophical stances and making pro-science philosophy redundant.

[drogulus]

Elgarian,

Please continue writing because I am learning a lot from your posts.  But please don't expect Ernie (drogulus) to appreciate the basics of philosophy.  He is stuck in Philosophy 101 with a failing grade.

     I never got that far. 

[drogulus]

     Elgarian, what procedure do you use to discriminate between reports of experience taken as veridical and those reassigned to more likely causes (UFOs? $5,000 speaker cables? Ghosts? Saviors?)? I don't imagine it differs much from mine. I'm merely reversing the usual habit of regarding ordinary verification as lesser truth subordinated to a higher metaphysical one, and instead making purported higher truths justify themselves or remain purely speculative. I don't privilege what is not known over what is. As a consequence my philosophical position, such as it is, holds no hostages against any procedure that proves itself at the practical level, and the highest truth is what is found as a matter of definition. So truth under this scheme is seen as relational, a tool, and not some unknown Other you propitiate.

[Catison]

     Elgarian, what procedure do you use to discriminate between reports of experience taken as veridical and those reassigned to more likely causes (UFOs? $5,000 speaker cables? Ghosts? Saviors?)? I don't imagine it differs much from mine. I'm merely reversing the usual habit of regarding ordinary verification as lesser truth subordinated to a higher metaphysical one, and instead making purported higher truths justify themselves or remain purely speculative. I don't privilege what is not known over what is. As a consequence my philosophical position, such as it is, holds no hostages against any procedure that proves itself at the practical level, and the highest truth is what is found as a matter of definition. So truth under this scheme is seen as relational, a tool, and not some unknown Other you propitiate.

The wheels on the bus go...

[drogulus]

     Is there anything about "higher, deeper" truths that differs from the lower, shallow truths we live by? You know the answer. What's higher and deeper is that they remain unknown (a detail to remember the next time you're tempted to say that in addition to being unavailable to reason that they are known to you and Certain), and when they become known what's higher and deeper about them then? Nothing...this is just a case of the bird in the bush, possibly real, having ever so much brighter plumage. Yeah, right. But catch the bird and the higher deeper plumage turns into just more of the same as the bird in the hand, with different detail to be sure but not of a different essence. There are no essences, only details in endless permutation. Learning the rules the permutations observe is the highest truth available. Since higher truth is defined by it's inaccessibility I see no reason to object to the consequences I point out. 

     How come nothing you know is higher and deeper than what you don't know? Could it be that our philosophy has taught us to prefer the uncaught bird, and endow it with magical powers that disappear on closer inspection? I think that's so. The imagination seeks an outlet in the unknown, and endows it with all the imagined properties evicted from the world we do know. What we know to be true is just as high and deep as the unknown on the other side of the fence.* The first turtle is just as wonderful as the one on the uh, bottom of the pile. We just know more and so are less prone to make up things about it.

      _{* I agree with the scientists who wonder at a comprehensible material Universe as ardently as the mysterians do their....whatever. I prefer the real jewels to the paste jobs of the holy books. There's a real world out there! Save your reverence for something that's worth it! 0:)}

[Elgarian]

That isn't exactly how I would describe the distinction I'm making. I'm proposing that things that consist of names and nothing public that can be attached to them be considered as true reports of experience which stand in need of explanation of the cause for them. If the cause can't be found in the world then the efficient explanation is that the cause of the experience is internal to the person having it.

Therein lies part of the problem. It's necessary to make those distinctions in order to find a question that can be meaningfully discussed. Otherwise we get into these eternal entanglements that can never be resolved. When you speak of things that 'consist of names and nothing public' and go on to discuss the consequences if they 'can't be found in the world' you've already sidestepped my questions by asserting that only the public is real, and that only your method of 'finding' is correct. There's no point in proceeding further until the question of the validity of that assumption is resolved. You may be right. I'm merely observing that your asserting it as the One True Way doesn't make it so.

Science and all methods for the finding of fact operate using natural assumptions because that's the only way they can work. I take the somewhat anomalous position that there is no real distinction to be made between the operational and the purportedly metaphysical. So, from the standpoint of the ontological/epistemological, science is philosophy, and the negative view scientists frequently have towards philosophy as a discipline dovetails neatly with the common view among them that they have what they need and don't need to bother with it further. I reinterpret this a little as science precluding anti-scientific philosophical stances and making pro-science philosophy redundant.

Well, I can see that's very neat. Very convenient. But it's a variant of an old, discarded philosophical standpoint. When you say 'science is philosophy' (thereby limiting the questions only to those that science declares to have meaning) - that's the position that Whitehead examined and so conclusively found wanting. There's some reinventing of a broken wheel being attempted here. Does it not trouble you that those scientists who say they 'don't need to bother with philosophy further' almost certainly have little knowledge or understanding of it? Or that by dismissing philosophy they lose the opportunity to discover not only how to think rationally, but also the limits of what can be achieved by rational thought? Of course many scientists will say they have no need of philosophy. Scientific exactness is a fake, and because of its visible success at what it attempts, it's capable of deluding both the scientist and the non-scientist alike into a mistaken belief in the completeness of its system.

If one were to acknowledge this, and then choose the scientific/verificationist route along the lines of 'nevertheless this is the road I will take as the most dependable', then that would be an understandable response to a difficult existential situation (albeit one that's impossible to follow rigorously in one's normal daily life). But to maintain it to be the One True Way (and defend one's position by declaring science to be philosophy) is to be intellectually as vulnerable as a persistent believer in Santa Claus;* and incidentally, it doesn't provide a very secure platform from which to take potshots at those who choose an alternative route.


*I don't say this flippantly. To believe persistently in Santa Claus one would have to consistently ignore all methods of enquiry that would cast doubt on the belief. That is effectively the 'science is philosophy' standpoint, for it excludes any possibility of refutation.

[Elgarian]

    Elgarian, what procedure do you use to discriminate between reports of experience taken as veridical and those reassigned to more likely causes (UFOs? $5,000 speaker cables? Ghosts? Saviors?)?

It depends on the nature of the experience reported, and on how much I want to be bothered with the trouble of discriminating. If you tell me that all values of electric charge are multiples of 'e', then there's a clear procedure for checking that out if I want to. (At least, up to a point. There's also a get-out clause for those one or two results that don't fit. I've seen those, and shrugged my shoulders like the best of them. The requirement for repeatability has its limitations, so the jury must remain out on 'all'.)

Ghosts, Saviours and the like? Well, if reported by others they would essentially remain unknown - though I don't attach any particular value to 'the unknown' in the way you describe. The unknown has no added value merely for being unknown. In fact it only becomes interesting once it becomes known, or at least if it offers the promise of becoming known. This is I think another of the mistakes you make when you attack these straw men ('names' being mistaken for real things, 'the unknown' being revered for its unknowableness, etc). The unknown is not necessarily the numinous, and the numinous is not necessarily unknown. For instance, I revere works of art the more for knowing them better, not less.

The difficulty here concerns what we mean by 'knowing'. I 'know' my wife loves me, and I 'know' that 5x4=20, and I 'know' that there are 24 hours in a day, but they aren't the same kind of 'knowing'. You're right that we probably all adopt a pretty similar approach - a mixture of intuition, expectation, reasoning, testing, subconscious desire, and so on - all in different proportions. For any of us, what we 'know' about the world is arrived at from a whole series of different mappings, not merely from the result of scientific enquiry. What we might 'know' about a possible divine being is going to be similarly complicated, don't you think?

Is there anything about "higher, deeper" truths that differs from the lower, shallow truths we live by? You know the answer. What's higher and deeper is that they remain unknown (a detail to remember the next time you're tempted to say that in addition to being unavailable to reason that they are known to you and Certain)

As I've explained above I think this equating of higher and deeper with the unknown is mistaken, and contrary to experience in general. And the barbed comment about knowledge and certainty is unnecessary and misplaced, I think. I hope my own uncertainty (not to mention awareness of the limitations of my knowledge) is evident in my posts. I'm inclined to discuss these things with you not because I'm certain of the path to follow (far from it), but because you seem to be and that puzzles me.

[Guido]

Sean - the original post is one of the most interesting and leucid that you have written here so cheers for that! I actually read all of it!

Elgarian,

Please continue writing because I am learning a lot from your posts.  But please don't expect Ernie (drogulus) to appreciate the basics of philosophy.  He is stuck in Philosophy 101 with a failing grade.

As I'm sure you're aware, posts like these reflect far worse on the poster than on the person being denigrated.

[Sean]

Hi Guido, I bought a copy of the book while away travelling and managed to get through it- he makes some good points about American religious fundamentalism but doggedly misses the more interesting questions about spirituality. So I put the initial post here up on the forum on his website and got a few replies, but it's not quite my best English.

[Guido]

Hi Guido, I bought a copy of the book while away travelling and managed to get through it- he makes some good points about American religious fundamentalism but doggedly misses the more interesting questions about spirituality. So I put the initial post here up on the forum on his website and got a few replies, but it's not quite my best English.

I wasn't being sarcastic - I actually meant it. Made me think, and made me want to find out about Hinduism too! I've never seen it explained in those terms before.

[Catison]

As I'm sure you're aware, posts like these reflect far worse on the poster than on the person being denigrated.

Hey now.  I don't have to be a philosophy teacher to recognize bad philosophy when I see it.

[Sean]

Guido

I've never seen it explained in those terms before.

I know you meant it, no prob. The philosophical foundations of Hinduism are the south Asian subcontinent's greatest contribution to humanity; indeed India is the world's cultural centre; I just had another six weeks there indeed. It's presuppositions, which in fact are more subtle and foundational than presuppositions, are so far outside the Western paradigm they're simply ignored, but many thinkers admire Hinduism and the Vedas.

[Sean]

http://en.wikiquote.org/wiki/Hinduism

[Guido]

Hey now.  I don't have to be a philosophy teacher to recognize bad philosophy when I see it.

It's the nasty way your opinion was delivered. I'm sure that Ernie doesn't mind, because he's used to it and things like this don't seem to affect him, but it's just unpleasant to read. Maybe you could explain why you think Ernie is wrong? The whole reason that Elgarian is producing these posts that you are learning from is because he is doing exactly that. The issue is far from settled. 

Not an attack, just didn't expect that from you is all!

[Guido]

Guido

I know you meant it, no prob. The philosophical foundations of Hinduism are the south Asian subcontinent's greatest contribution to humanity; indeed India is the world's cultural centre; I just had another six weeks there indeed. It's presuppositions, which in fact are more subtle and foundational than presuppositions, are so far outside the Western paradigm they're simply ignored, but many thinkers admire Hinduism and the Vedas.

Cheers - I will certainly try and read some stuff.

[Sean]

Cheers - I will certainly try and read some stuff.

A lot also depends on the translation, the original language being ancient Sanskrit. I bought an edition of the Bhagavad Gita, which is the most important work, while I was abroad and it was Christianized so ludicrously it was past the point of being laughable and unreadable. The translation and commentary by Maharishi Mahesh Yogi is highly recommendable though- it's a Penguin from about 1968.